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BETWEEN SAVIORS AND SAVAGES: THE EFFECT OF 
TURKEY’S REVISED PENAL CODE ON THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF HONOR KILLINGS INTO HONOR 
SUICIDES AND WHY COMMUNITY DISCOURSE IS 
NECESSARY FOR HONOR CRIME ERADICATION 
Bethany A. Corbin∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Ka thought it strangely depressing that the suicide girls had to 
struggle to find a private moment to kill themselves. Even after 
swallowing their pills, even as they lay quietly dying, they’d had to 
share their rooms with others.1 
The savage phrase contained in a simple text message haunted Derya’s 
mind.2 Her moment of freedom and independence sparked by unpermitted love 
shattered instantly, replaced with all-consuming shame and fear. Derya knew 
the risks that accompanied her forbidden acts—her own aunt had been 
murdered by her grandfather for seeing a boy.3 Yet, Derya defied her family’s 
orders and refused to heed her mother’s death warnings. As she flirted with 
danger, news of her love affair spread, and at age seventeen she received a 
devastating order from her uncle: “You have blackened our name,” the text 
message read.4 “Kill yourself and clean our shame, or we will kill you first.”5 
 
 ∗ J.D., Wake Forest University School of Law, 2013; B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
2011. I wish to thank Dr. Banu Gökariksel, Associate Professor of Geography at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, for introducing me to the topic of honor killings and sparking my interest in 
worldwide domestic violence research. Thank you for being a mentor on this topic for the last four years.  
 1 ORHAN PAMUK, SNOW 24 (Maureen Freely Trans., Everyman’s Library 2004) (2011). 
 2 Derya’s story is adapted from online news articles. See, e.g., Dan Bilefsky, How to Avoid Honor 
Killing in Turkey? Honor Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/16/world/ 
europe/16turkey.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&; Jan Goodwin, Honor Suicides in Turkey, MARIE CLAIRE (May 
25, 2007), http://www.marieclaire.com/world-reports/news/turkey-women; Lee Habeeb, The Real War on 
Women, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Apr. 26, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/296958/real-
war-women-lee-habeeb.  
 3 Bilefsky, supra note 2.  
 4 Id. 
 5 Id.  
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This severe and inhumane sanction from her family arose from one simple 
action—Derya had fallen in love with Recep, a high school classmate.6 Having 
never experienced love, Derya clung tightly to her new romance, talking with 
Recep daily on the phone. When Derya’s uncle learned of the communication, 
he confiscated her phone and alerted her family. But Derya couldn’t stop. She 
borrowed a friend’s phone and continued the relationship, angry about her 
family’s strict requirements.7 As the romance progressed, Derya faced 
increasing violence at home, until one day she received a message instructing 
her to never return home again and to kill herself. 
These threatening messages arrived fifteen times per day and served as a 
death sentence.8 “My family attacked my personality, and I felt I had 
committed the biggest sin in the world,” Derya confided.9 “I felt I had no right 
to dishonor my family, that I have no right to be alive. So I decided to respect 
my family’s desire and to die.”10 The overpowering shame and guilt forced 
Derya to jump into the Tigris River in an effort to commit suicide.11 But the 
attempt failed and she survived. Determined to fulfill her family’s wishes, 
Derya next tried to hang herself; an uncle saved her life.12 Finally, Derya 
slashed her wrists with a kitchen knife.13 
Although Derya ultimately survived her three suicide attempts, her story 
illuminates a developing and frightening trend in Turkey—the emergence of 
honor suicides as an alternative to honor killings.14 Described broadly as 
“honor crimes,” both honor killings and honor suicides are rooted in 
patriarchal orders based on the authority of men.15 Perceived as unquestionably 
horrific forms of violence, honor crimes occur when a family member has 
 
 6 Goodwin, supra note 2.  
 7 Derya was particularly upset over the loss of her cell phone privilege, stating, “Part of me was angry. 
Everyone uses cell phones. Why not me?” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 8 Bilefsky, supra note 2; Goodwin, supra note 2.  
 9 Bilefsky, supra note 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 10 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 11 Id.; Goodwin, supra note 2 (explaining that in June 2006, “Derya threw herself into the fast-flowing 
Tigris River near the Iraqi border, but a passing police patrol pulled her out”).  
 12 Bilefsky, supra note 2; Goodwin, supra note 2. Derya attempted to hang herself by attaching a rope to 
a ceiling hook that was meant to hold a baby’s cradle. Goodwin, supra note 2. When Derya pushed the chair 
out from beneath her legs, her uncle heard the crash and cut her down. Id.  
 13 Bilefsky, supra note 2; Goodwin, supra note 2; Habeeb, supra note 2.  
 14 Goodwin, supra note 2. 
 15 See John A. Cohan, Honor Killings and Cultural Defense, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 177, 191 (2010); see 
also Necla Mora, Violence as a Communicative Action: Customary and Honor Killings, 6 INT’L J. HUM. SCI. 
499, 506 (2009).  
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violated a social or moral norm that brings shame and dishonor to the family.16 
Frequently, the norm violated is sexual in nature and the scope of acts that can 
trigger an honor killing or suicide is vast.17 Because women are seen as 
“symbolic bearers of the honor of the clan or tribe,” this sexual contamination 
is typically punished by murder in order to regain social status.18 
Recently, however, scholars and journalists have identified a shift away 
from honor killings—in which a male family member murders his own kin—to 
honor suicides—in which the female transgressor is forced to take her own 
life.19 This alleged transformation has been widely attributed to the adoption of 
Turkey’s revised Penal Code in late 2004, which mandated harsh criminal 
sentences for both the honor killing perpetrator and family members who 
encouraged the killing.20 Faced with this new prospect of imprisonment, 
scholars have argued that honor killings have undergone a metamorphosis into 
honor suicides to prevent the clan from losing two family members.21 This 
causal connection between honor suicides and the revised Turkish Penal Code 
was widely espoused in Turkish media and honor killing scholarship. 
This Article, however, disputes the causal linkage of honor suicides with 
Turkey’s new Penal Code, and argues that the existence of honor suicides has 
simply garnered increased media attention since 2004. In particular, this 
Article asserts that the statistical data is insufficient to support an association 
between harsher criminal punishments and honor suicides. Rather, scholars 
have used the revised Penal Code as a scapegoat to avoid addressing the 
problematic aspects of Turkey’s underlying honor culture. As one of the first 
articles to provide an in-depth analysis and critique of this causal connection, 
this Article challenges the conclusory statements of scholars and the press, and 
advances the position that honor suicides existed within Turkey prior to the 
adoption of the revised Penal Code. 
In support of this argument, this Article is divided into six parts. Part I 
offers an overview and description of honor killings, defines the concept of 
 
 16 See Hilal O. Ince et al., Customary Killings in Turkey and Turkish Modernization, 45 MIDDLE E. STUD. 
537, 538 (2009). 
 17 See, e.g., Bilefsky, supra note 2.  
 18 Cynthia F. Epstein, Death by Gender, 57 DISSENT 54, 54 (2010).  
 19 See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 2.  
 20 See Sezgin Cihangir, Gender Specific Honor Codes and Cultural Change, 16 GROUP PROCESS 
INTERGROUP REL. 319, 322 (2013).  
 21 See id.; Helena Smith, When Wrong Boyfriends or Clothes Lead Daughters to Kill Themselves, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2007), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/23/turkey.gender.  
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honor within Turkish society, and answers the pressing question of whether 
Islam condones these crimes. Part II narrows the focus of this Article solely to 
honor killings within Turkey’s borders, and analyzes honor killing perception 
within Turkey. Specifically, Part II highlights the ethnicization of honor 
killings as a Kurdish phenomenon and discusses the motivations behind this 
depiction. The section then transitions into an exploration of how Turkey’s bid 
for European Union (“EU”) accession forced Turkey to adopt harsher criminal 
sanctions against honor killing perpetrators. Part III advances this analysis by 
identifying the key honor killing legislation in both the unrevised and revised 
Penal Codes. With the stage appropriately set, Part IV provides a critique of 
the linkage between honor suicides and the revised Turkish Penal Code, and 
argues that the emergence of honor suicides is not causally related to Turkey’s 
legal reformation. In fact, Part V details why legal revision has been 
ineffective in appreciably reducing honor crimes, and why a dialogue of 
cultural discourse is fundamental to the eradication of both honor killings and 
honor suicides. Finally, Part VI concludes the Article. 
I. DEFINING HONOR KILLINGS 
The term “honor killing” refers to the organized murder of a family 
member—typically female—for bringing perceived shame and dishonor to her 
family or community.22 Committed by fathers against daughters and brothers 
against sisters, honor killings are the result of carefully debated plans by a 
family council in which the youngest male is elected to perform the murder.23 
Lacking spontaneity, these crimes adhere to a rigid organizational structure 
that differentiates honor killings from the larger worldwide phenomenon of 
femicide.24 Specifically, honor killings are a form of “internal, societal 
violence that goes beyond families”25 and arises from the prerogative to avoid 
social ostracism.26 These murders transcend the bounds of the family home and 
 
 22 See Tenzin Dorjee et al., A Social Ecological Perspective on Understanding “Honor Killing”: An 
Intercultural Moral Dilemma, 42 J. INTERCULTURAL COMM. RES. 1, 3 (2013) (“[H]onor killing is defined here 
as one that involves killing or murdering a female family member by her own family members and family 
friends to avenge shame brought by infidelity or other culturally unacceptable behaviors.”).  
 23 Recep Doğan, Is Honor Killing a “Muslim Phenomenon”? Textual Interpretations and Cultural 
Representations, 31 J. MUSLIM MINORITY AFF. 423, 423 (2011). 
 24 See AYSE ONAL, HONOUR KILLING: STORIES OF MEN WHO KILLED 10 (2008) (discussing the 
difference between honor killings and domestic violence); Doğan, supra note 23, at 423 (“Honor killing is the 
product of social interactions amongst members of society; and it is qualitatively different from other kinds of 
murders.”).  
 25 ONAL, supra note 24, at 255.  
 26 See id. at 26. 
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represent an extreme form of revenge that becomes mandatory when no 
alternative exists for restoring family honor. In this manner, honor killings can 
be perceived as the failure of a family to adequately control the sexual 
behavior of its female members.27 This section provides a pertinent explanation 
of honor and the characteristics of honor killings, serving as the foundation for 
the discussion of Turkish honor killings and the revised Turkish Penal Code. 
A. What is Honor? 
The elusive and dynamic term “honor” represents virtue, on the one hand, 
and hierarchical dominance on the other.28 Operating worldwide as a form of 
social currency, honor functions informally as property29 and serves as a 
“cornerstone in the construction of gender identity.”30 Although the precise 
definition of honor differs from region to region and culture to culture, honor 
has remained a fundamental property of human beings for centuries. Typically 
viewed as a measure of social prestige within the community, honor is an 
acquired and earned trait subject to constant defense and loss.31 
The “Western” notion of honor is customarily defined in terms of integrity 
and virtuous behavior.32 It is an achieved status, increasing or decreasing with 
the owner’s accomplishments and actions.33 In Turkey, this form of honor is 
specifically denoted seref, and is possessed and controlled exclusively by men 
as a marker of social worth and reputation.34 Remaining independent from the 
actions of females, seref is not implicated in the honor killing analysis, but 
rather stands in stark contrast to its counterpart, namus. 
Namus, which creates the foundation for Turkish honor killings, represents 
a form of sexual honor “that presupposes physical and moral qualities that 
 
 27 See Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, The Role of ‘Community Discourse’ in Combating ‘Crimes of Honour’: 
Preliminary Assessment and Prospects, in ‘HONOUR’ CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
65, 67 (Lynn Welchman & Sara Hossain eds., 2005).  
 28 Alina Zvinkliene, ‘Honour Killings’ in Modern Societies: A Sociological Perspective, 1 ISLAM & 
CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL 532, 532 (2010).  
 29 Johanna Bond, Honor as Property, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 202, 202 (2012).  
 30 Zvinkliene, supra note 28, at 532.  
 31 See Cohan, supra note 15, at 181–83.  
 32 Aysan Sev’er & Gökçeçiçek Yurdakul, Culture of Honor, Culture of Change: A Feminist Analysis of 
Honor Killings in Rural Turkey, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 964, 971 (2001) (defining honor as “moral 
integrity, the esteem accorded to virtue or talent”).  
 33 See id. at 972.  
 34 KATHERINE PRATT EWING, STOLEN HONOR: STIGMATIZING MUSLIM MEN IN BERLIN 32 (2008); Sev’er 
& Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 972.  
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women ought to have.”35 Reflecting on the whole family, namus refers directly 
to the sexual purity of females and stresses traditional gender roles in which 
women are expected to assume and accept subordinate social positions.36 
Structured as a gender-specific code of honor, namus requires females to 
maintain their family’s social reputation through sexual purity and creates a 
preoccupation with women’s chastity.37 In this sense, honor is located solely 
within the female body and controlled through the female’s actions.38 Men 
possess no namus of their own, and women carry the heavy “burden of 
safeguarding group identity and group honor.”39 
While men cannot directly claim namus, they are fundamentally impacted 
by any loss of female virtue.40 A wrong decision related to female honor 
inevitably humiliates the entire family on a communal level and disgraces the 
male kin. Because honor serves as the barometer of familial worth, the male 
family members actively strive to control the female’s namus by restricting her 
sexual behavior.41 This male domination of female sexuality operates on a 
community-wide level and leads to the development of extreme sanctions 
aimed at controlling the sexual behavior of women.42 In this manner, women 
serve as the agents of men when it comes to their sexuality and are perceived 
 
 35 AYSAN SEV’ER, PATRIARCHAL MURDERS OF WOMEN: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF HONOUR-BASED 
KILLINGS IN TURKEY AND IN THE WEST 115 (2013); Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 973.  
 36 KARL A. ROBERTS ET AL., HONOR-BASED VIOLENCE: POLICING AND PREVENTION 19 (2014) (“[H]onor 
cultures can be described as stressing ‘traditional’ gender roles in which there is high inequality between the 
genders. Males have most of the political power and females are expected to maintain subordinate social 
positions . . . .”); Yvette van Osch et al., A Different Kind of Honor Culture: Family Honor and Aggression in 
Turks, 16 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 334, 335 (2013); see JAN GOODWIN, PRICE OF HONOR: 
MUSLIM WOMEN LIFT THE VEIL OF SILENCE ON THE ISLAMIC WORLD 8 (2003) (noting that “[t]he honor of the 
Muslim family is believed to reside in a woman’s chastity and modesty”).  
 37 Cihangir, supra note 20, at 321; Gul Ozyegin, Virginal Facades: Sexual Freedom and Guilt among 
Young Turkish Women, 16 EUR. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 103, 111 (2009); see Purna Sen, ‘Crimes of Honour’, 
Value and Meaning, in ‘HONOUR’ CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 42, 51 (Lynn 
Welchman & Sara Hossain eds., 2005) (“The honour code thus reflects and contributes to socially legitimated 
constructions of gender norms that shape and reflect behaviours and are not separate from these.”).  
 38 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Preface to the ‘HONOUR’ CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN xi, xi (Lynn Welchman & Sara Hossain eds., 2005); ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 36, at 22.  
 39 Ozyegin, supra note 37, at 111; see UNNI WIKAN, IN HONOR OF FADIME: MURDER AND SHAME 86 
(Anna Paterson trans., 2003) (noting that women “represent honor; they symbolize honor; they are honor”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 973 (explaining that namus is always 
determined by female family members).  
 40 Cohan, supra note 15, at 187 (“In part, the modesty code is derived from the idea that men can become 
contaminated or defiled by women.”). 
 41 See id. (“The honor of the village group lies with the modesty of its women and the readiness of its 
men to protect this modesty.”).  
 42 Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 975–76.  
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solely as producers of shame.43 Thus, honor killings are premised on what has 
been popularized as the honor-shame complex—“the aggressor’s sense of 
identity or failing is based on the behavior of another.”44 In this complex, 
honor is seen through the lens of the “West” as a motive which propels men to 
kill for reasons that are perceived as petty, unreasonable, or backward.45 
Therefore, for an honor killing to occur, there must first be a loss of female 
honor and acquisition of shame upon the family. 
B. The Characteristics of Honor Killings 
Honor codes—and the crimes associated with them—are not solely 
concerned with individual men controlling individual women. Rather, honor 
crimes “are about community norms, social policing and collective decisions 
and acts of punishment.”46 Killing based on shame and tainted honor occurs 
within a family structure where the bonds of affection, love, and obedience 
bind all participants to the murder.47 Created as the product of social 
interactions among societal members, “[h]onor killings are a recurrent form of 
[domestic and] intra-familial violence, finding vindication and acceptance in 
society and the law.”48 Once rumors of a female’s transgressions spread 
throughout the community, killing the offending female is an obligation of the 
disgraced family, and the only means of restoring lost honor.49 Therefore, 
honor killing can be defined as the deliberate murder of a disobedient or 
shameful family member by a familial council for the sole purpose of 
absolving the family’s honor. 
 
 43 See Aisha K. Gill, Feminist Reflections on Researching So-called ‘Honor’ Killings, 21 FEMINIST 
LEGAL STUD. 241, 243 (2013) (“[M]en are responsible for acquiring honour for their families, while women 
are seen as potential producers of shame.”).  
 44 Nancy V. Baker et al., Family Killing Fields: Honor Rationales in the Murder of Women, 5 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 164, 177 (1999); see EWING, supra note 34, at 29–30 (discussing the honor-shame 
complex).  
 45 Sen, supra note 37, at 45.  
 46 Id. at 48.  
 47 Shahrzad Mojab & Amir Hassanpour, In Memory of Fadime Sahindal: Thoughts on the Struggle 
Against “Honor Killing”, KURDISH WOMEN ACTION AGAINST HONOR KILLING (Oct. 17, 2002), http://www. 
kwahk.org/articles.asp?id=30.  
 48 Rachel A. Ruane, Murder in the Name of Honor: Violence against Women in Jordan and Pakistan, 14 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1523, 1530 (2000). 
 49 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, PAKISTAN (2002); see Susanne J. Prochazka, There is No Honor in Honor 
Killings: Why Women At Risk for Defying Sociosexual Norms Must be Considered a “Particular Social 
Group” Under Asylum Law, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 445, 447 (2012) (mentioning that honor killings 
“allegedly wash away the shame with blood and restore the tarnished honor.”).  
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Although honor killings are unquestionably related to domestic violence, 
they nonetheless represent an extreme form of femicide uniquely differentiated 
by five characteristics. First, honor killings involve gender relations and 
interactions designed solely to control women’s behavior and sexuality.50 As 
symbols of reproduction, women help to create allegiances between male 
groups that enable the family to strengthen its economic connections within the 
community.51 In this context, a woman is often exchanged for marriage to 
improve social standing or increase familial wealth. According to Nicole Pope, 
“[a] woman is just a commodity and her ‘owners’, her male relatives, have the 
right to make decisions on her behalf without consulting her.”52 This view of 
women remains deeply entrenched in tribal culture, and any impurity in the 
woman substantially decreases her value to the family.53 If fact, because the 
morality surrounding females is so strict, the male relatives tend to distort 
reality and blame women for actions beyond their control—for example, 
rape.54 Because of this, the female’s behavior is constantly monitored and 
restricted throughout her life, particularly with arranged marriages and the 
prohibition on premarital sex.55 
Second, not only do males assume an active role in the regulation of female 
behavior, but other women within the family partake and assist in monitoring 
the subordinate females of the household.56 Within the hierarchical family, the 
eldest mother or wife commands the greatest authority and respect among 
 
 50 Canan Arin, Femicide in the Name of Honor in Turkey, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 821, 822 
(2001); Anand Kirti et al., The Face of Honour Based Crimes: Global Concerns and Solutions, 6 INT’L J. 
CRIM. JUST. SCI. 343, 353 (2011).  
 51 Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Researching Women’s Victimisation in Palestine: A Socio-Legal 
Analysis, in ‘HONOUR’ CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 160, 162 (Lynn Welchman & 
Sara Hossain eds., 2005). 
 52 Nicole Pope, Honour Killings: Instruments of Patriarchal Control, in VIOLENCE IN THE NAME OF 
HONOUR: THEORETICAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES 101, 102 (Shahrzad Mojab & Nahla Abdo eds., 2004); 
see Arin, supra note 50, at 823 (“In this traditional system, women are not considered individuals; they are the 
property of the family and are seen to represent its reputation or honor, and, like other forms of property, they 
can be bought and sold.”).  
 53 See Valerie Plant, Honor Killings and the Asylum Gender Gap, 15 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 109, 
111 (2005) (“In many cultures, an individual’s identity is closely tied to their family unit. In such a culture, the 
family’s honor is viewed as a personal reflection on each member of the family.”).  
 54 Ince et al., supra note 16, at 538.  
 55 Diana Y. Vitoshka, The Modern Face of Honor Killing: Factors, Legal Issues, and Policy 
Recommendations, 22 BERKELEY UNDERGRADUATE J. 1, 6 (2010). 
 56 Plant, supra note 53, at 112 (stating that women are often involved in the act and decision to kill); see 
Ince et al., supra note 16, at 548.  
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other women.57 It is this female figure who actively supervises the younger 
women to ensure they do not tarnish the family’s honor.58 Any help to defend 
the improper actions of younger female relatives disappears immediately if it 
conflicts with the eldest woman’s loyalty towards men.59 While loyalty 
between women can potentially save lives, it is quite common for mothers to 
be blamed for the transgressions of daughters, which gives them a vested 
interest in the behavior of their family members.60 Thus, women within a 
family are often vigilant and conscientious of the actions of all female 
members, and are prone to turn against one another.61 In this manner, women 
help to participate in the honor killing process. 
Third, because of the involvement of both males and females in the 
regulation of honor, the decision to pursue an honor killing results from a 
collective family meeting.62 Honor crimes are not the result of spontaneous 
male anger or passion, but rather occur with the collective agreement of all 
family council members and a well-defined plan.63 At a minimum, the family 
council consists of “the father and brother[s] of the victim, and may also 
include uncles, grandfathers, male in-laws, and the mother.”64 In this way, 
honor killings cannot be reduced to the psychological imbalances of the 
individual killer, since the final decision belongs to the collective family as a 
whole. 
Fourth, given the considerable deliberation, discussion, and planning 
among family members before an honor crime occurs, the council typically 
elects the youngest male to perform the killing. The young age of the 
 
 57 NICOLE POPE, HONOR KILLINGS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 103 (Palgrave Macmillan 1st ed. 
2012) (“Imposing matriarchs may rule over the younger generation with an iron fist, often making life a 
misery for their daughters-in-law . . . .”).  
 58 Asa Elden, Men’s Violence and Women’s Responsibility: Mothers’ Stories about Honour Violence, in 
HONOUR, VIOLENCE, WOMEN AND ISLAM 128, 133–34 (Mohammad M. Idriss & Tahir Abbas eds., 2011).  
 59 Id. at 134.  
 60 Id. at 130–34.  
 61 Id. at 130 (“Mothers are thus described as active in, and directly or indirectly responsible for, the 
violence to which young women are exposed.”).  
 62 Ince et al., supra note 16, at 538; Katie L. Zaunbrecher, Comment, When Culture Hurts: Dispelling the 
Myth of Cultural Justification for Gender-Based Human Rights Violations, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 679, 700 
(2011).  
 63 Kenneth Lasson, Bloodstains on a “Code of Honor”: The Murderous Marginalization of Women in 
the Islamic World, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 407, 415 (2009); see Veena Meetoo & Heidi S. Mirza, “There is 
Nothing ‘Honourable’ about Honour Killings”: Gender, Violence and the Limits of Multiculturalism, 30 
WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 187 (2007) (noting that other family members participate in honor killings beyond 
just the husband or partner).  
 64 Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 965.  
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perpetrator elicits the sympathy of the courts in case of a criminal trial, and 
results in a reduced sentence or acquittal.65 These sentence reductions evidence 
state complicity in honor killings by legitimating shame as an acceptable 
motive for murder. When the perpetrators defend their actions in court, they 
repeatedly reference culture and tradition as excuses mandating leniency.66 By 
accepting these defenses and invoking culture as justification for killing, the 
state inherently relinquishes its role as the only source of law in society. In 
Southeastern Turkey, for example, the average sentence for an honor killing 
was just 19.7 years in prison during 1990–2005, with a 24% acquittal rate.67 
Clans are thus able to exert their own moral codes and visions into social 
practice when they are confident the state will not interfere. Therefore, the 
election of the youngest male to perform the murder is a strategic decision 
designed to manipulate the judicial process.68 
Finally, there is always an ability to regain honor through a successful 
killing. Although less drastic alternatives to murder exist when faced with 
perceived shame, the only purpose of an honor killing is to restore the family’s 
honor and reputation.69 Hence, honor killings are only performed when the 
family risks unquestionable social ostracism or embarrassment that cannot be 
mitigated through punishing the offending female in another manner.70 When 
faced with an accusation of impropriety, the balance of power shifts 
dramatically between clans and families and places the burden of proof on the 
female and her natal family to disprove the allegations.71 No benefit of the 
doubt is given to the female, and when the gossip becomes public knowledge, 
violence typically ensues.72 With the introduction of shame into the equation, 
 
 65 Efsa Kuraner, Celebrations of Love: Women Denounce Honor Killings in Turkey, 32 OFF OUR BACKS 
28 (2002) (“The task is usually relegated to a minor male member of the family as he can benefit from the 
circumstances of underage.”); Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 985. For an in-depth discussion of 
sentences imposed by the Turkish courts for honor killings, see Ceren Belge, Whose Law?: Clans, Honor 
Killings, and State-Minority Relations in Turkey and Israel (Jan. 1, 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Washington) (on file with the University of Washington library).  
 66 Ince et al., supra note 16, at 538 (“The killers in customary killings widely use traditions, customs, 
values and beliefs, as well as the term ‘honour’ itself, as their legitimating referents.”).  
 67 Belge, supra note 65, at 55.  
 68 See Ince et al., supra note 16, at 545 (discussing that “being under the full legal age was another reason 
for a reduced sentence in customary killings”).  
 69 Mora, supra note 15, at 507 (“Family members, who become a target of any insult, gossip, or rumor 
especially on women, perceive this condition as a stain that needs to be cleaned.”). 
 70 See Dorjee et al., supra note 22, at 6 (“Honor killings are the extreme manifestations of these 
communal face desires, and facework strategies are often needed to recoup damaged family shame and 
community honor.”). 
 71 Belge, supra note 65, at 173.  
 72 Vitoshka, supra note 55, at 14. 
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the transgression becomes the concern of the entire community, not just the 
victim’s immediate family.73 The harm to a female’s reputation can only be 
repaired with murder, and the killer is praised for his actions.74 No sympathy is 
displayed towards the female transgressor who has paid for the family’s honor 
with her life.75 Thus, males are often perceived as victims of their own 
circumstances while the female is simply disposable property used to increase 
the family’s standing within the community.76 
Therefore, while honor killings remain part of the worldwide spectrum of 
domestic violence, they are particularized and distinct murders that occur on a 
societal level as the result of a collective family vote. The killing buries both 
the victim and her disgrace, and erases the basic human right to life.77 Despite 
these distinctions, however, it is important to remember that femicide is not 
particular to one culture or religious group. Women experience universal and 
place-based violence that cuts across race, religion, and class.78 Although 
honor killings are an unquestionably heinous crime on the spectrum of 
violence, we must also raise issue with domestic violence within our own 
borders.79 Focusing on culturally specific forms of violence is perceived as 
controversial ground,80 and this Article in no way attempts to stereotype any 
group or space as backward or barbaric. 
C. The Role of Islam in Honor Killings 
The uniqueness of honor killings arises not solely from the five 
characteristics discussed above, but also from its developed association with a 
particular religion—Islam. A common misconception exists among the 
“Western” part of the world that honor killings occur solely in Islamic nations 
 
 73 Meetoo & Mirza, supra note 63, at 189. 
 74 Ince et al., supra note 16, at 538 (“The family and their social environment do not perceive customary 
killings as a crime, since they view them as the only way of regaining lost honour.”); Plant, supra note 53, at 
112 (“In cultures in which honor killings take place, the family members of the offending woman typically see 
her slaughter as the only solution to the taint on their family honor.”); see Gill, supra note 43, at 249 
(describing that the community views the killer as heroic).  
 75 Plant, supra note 53, at 112. 
 76 Gill, supra note 43, at 249; see Anushree Tripathi & Supriya Yadav, For the Sake of Honour: But 
Whose Honour? “Honour Crimes” Against Women, 2 ASIA-PACIFIC J. HUMAN RTS. & L. 63, 65 (2004) 
(noting that women in honor societies are seen as commodities, “not human beings endowed with dignity and 
right equal to those of men”).  
 77 Shalhoub-Kevorkian, supra note 51, at 168.  
 78 Meetoo & Mirza, supra note 63, at 188.  
 79 Id.  
 80 Id. 
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and are therefore justified under Islamic law (Sharia).81 Relevant literature and 
popular news culture provide an overwhelming perception that honor killings 
are ubiquitous in Islamic and Arab countries, and portray the crime as a 
uniquely Muslim phenomenon.82 Honor-related violence has thus been 
advertised—especially post-9/11—as being supported by Islamic scriptures 
and the Qur’an (also spelled Kuran).83 
While honor killings occur disproportionately in Muslim societies, the 
crime is not limited to these communities and finds no support in the Qur’an or 
Sharia.84 Honor killings are prevalent in religious affiliations across Africa, 
South Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.85 Sikhs and 
Hindus specifically have been faulted for their recent involvement in honor 
crimes, particularly in India, and the victims can be and sometimes are 
Christians.86 A study performed by National Geographic even showed frequent 
honor killings in Great Britain, Brazil, Ecuador, Italy, Sweden, and 
Bangladesh.87 Therefore, the common notion that honor crimes occur solely 
within Muslim territory is misguided and misinformed. 
In fact, honor killings pre-date all written religions.88 Early justifications 
for honor crimes can be found in the codes of Hammurabi in 1752 B.C. and in 
the family law of the Roman Empire.89 “Ancient Roman and French law both 
 
 81 Lila Abu-Lughod, Seductions of the “Honor Crime”, 22 DIFFERENCES 17, 17–18 (2011) [hereinafter 
Abu-Lughod, Seductions]; Zaunbrecher, supra note 62, at 699. Sharia “consists of sources of legislation—the 
Koran and the hadiths (stories about the Prophet’s sayings and doings) and interpretations of these sources.” 
Anne S. Roald, Multiculturalism and Religious Legislation in Sweden, in MUSLIM DIASPORA IN THE WEST: 
NEGOTIATING GENDER, HOME AND BELONGING 55, 60 (Haideh Moghissi & Halleh Ghorashi eds., 2010).  
 82 See, e.g., Lisa Daftari, Muslim Backlash Against Film Will Hurt Women, Says ‘Honor Diaries’ Team, 
FOX NEWS (April 2, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/04/02/muslim-backlash-against-film-will-hurt-
women-says-honor-diaries-team/. 
 83 See generally Celeste Montoya & Lise R. Agustín, The Othering of Domestic Violence: The EU and 
Cultural Framings of Violence Against Women, 20 INT’L STUD. GENDER, STATE & SOC’Y 534 (2013) 
(describing honor-related violence in the context of Islamophobia and Europe’s exclusionary approach).  
 84 Cohan, supra note 15, at 196.  
 85 Id. at 192; see WIKAN, supra note 39, at 70 (“Honor killing can be found across religions and faiths.”).  
 86 See Phyllis Chesler, Are Some Honor Killings More Equal Than Others?, FOX NEWS (July 12, 2010), 
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/07/12/phyllis-chesler-muslim-honor-killings-media/; Ambrosia 
Sabrina, Honor Killings: 10 Chilling Facts on the Hidden Epidemic, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012, 6:35 
AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/honor-killings-10-chilling-facts-hidden-epidemic-402432.  
 87 Hillary Mayell, Thousands of Women Killed for Family “Honor”, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 12, 
2002), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/02/0212_020212_honorkilling.html.  
 88 Ruane, supra note 48, at 1530 (citing Cinema Reel Life: Crimes of Honor (Cinemax broadcast Feb. 28, 
2000)).  
 89 Lasson, supra note 63, at 408; see David J. Western, Islamic “Purse Strings”: The Key to the 
Amelioration of Women’s Legal Rights in the Middle East, 61 A.F. L. REV. 79, 107 (2008).  
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allowed a man to murder his wife or daughter for illicit sexual relationships 
under certain circumstances.”90 In almost every human society, families and 
communities have played an extensive role in regulating the sexual behavior of 
their members, typically beginning through early socialization of children. 
Furthermore, sentences for crimes committed in the “heat of passion,” which 
included honor killings, were substantially mitigated under the French and 
Italian Penal Codes until 1975 and 1979, respectively.91 In Brazil, honor 
killings were legal until 1991.92 The origins of honor killings can thus be 
traced back to ancient tribal practices that existed before—and continued 
after—the invention of Islamic law, with penal codes providing leniency for 
honor killers across the globe.93 
Moreover, Islamic law does not promote or condone honor killings, and no 
explicit approval of honor crimes exists in the Qur’an.94 Because honor killings 
are acts of murder, the practice is expressly prohibited in the Qur’an: “Whoso 
kills a believer intentionally, his penalty is hell, abiding therein eternally. God 
shall be angry with him and curse him, and shall ready for him a grievous 
torment.”95 The Qur’an places a high value on every person’s life, and honor 
killings are not grounded in any religious text. Rather, Islam represents a 
monotheistic religion that promotes the faith and unity of God, and upholds the 
notion that men and women are equal before God (Allah).96 The Qur’an 
expressly denies discrimination against women97 and does not provide a basis 
for the existence of gender hierarchies within societies that perpetuate honor 
killings. Consequently, Islam does not advance male superiority but instead 
recognizes the equality of potential between the sexes. 
 
 90 Plant, supra note 53, at 114.  
 91 Vitoshka, supra note 55, at 10. 
 92 Plant, supra note 53, at 114.  
 93 See Matthew A. Goldstein, The Biological Roots of Heat-of-Passion Crimes and Honor Killings, 21 
POL. & LIFE SCI. 28, 32 (2002) (“The Germanic tribes of Western Europe, as well as the Chinese, Japanese, 
and other Asian cultures legally sanctioned the killing of unfaithful wives by their husbands to protect family 
honor.”).  
 94 Western, supra note 89, at 107 (“Indeed, honor killings were and are forbidden under Islamic law, and 
should never be practiced under any circumstances.”).  
 95 THE QUR’AN 4:93 (Tarif Khalidi trans., The Penguin Group 2008); see Western, supra note 89, at 104 
(“According to the Quran, if either a man or women commits adultery, they should be flogged with a hundred 
lashes. Nowhere does the Quran justify killing the adulterer.”).  
 96 See GOODWIN, supra note 36, at 30 (“Islam, in fact, may be the only religion that formally specified 
women’s rights and sought ways to protect them.”).  
 97 Id. at 31.  
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Furthermore, Muslims themselves, including both victims and perpetrators, 
vigorously deny any connection between honor killings and Islam.98 Instead, 
the justification given by those involved in the honor killing process is that 
“tradition is stronger than religion.”99 Perpetrators invoke the excuse of custom 
instead of religion, and argue that principles of gender relations in Sharia are 
consistent with human rights law in the “West.”100 It is additionally 
“paradoxical that such practices are regarded as ‘Islamic’ in the West, 
considering that they have in fact come to the international agenda as a result 
of successful campaigns by Muslim feminist” movements.101 Therefore, the 
association between Islam and honor crimes needs to be perceived within the 
current climate of Islamophobia and post-9/11 depictions of Muslims as 
barbaric terrorists.102 Any inherent linkage of honor killings with Islam is 
simplistic and naïve. 
II. HONOR KILLINGS IN TURKEY & TURKEY’S EUROPEAN UNION ACCESSION 
PROSPECTS 
While honor killings are not particular to Muslim societies, the crime 
occurs within Turkey, a Muslim-majority country, at an alarming rate. The 
number of honor killings in Turkey—and worldwide—is difficult to gauge due 
to the fact that honor killings are misinterpreted, and therefore mis-reported as 
suicides or accidental deaths.103 The Turkish Human Rights Directorate 
estimated the number of honor killings at one per week in Istanbul alone, with 
over one thousand honor killings occurring in Istanbul from 2003 to 2008.104 
Other organizations, however, posit that only twenty-five to seventy-five honor 
killings occur annually in Turkey.105 These organizations suggest that honor 
killings in Turkey are confined to a limited region—specifically southeastern 
 
 98 Katherine P. Ewing, From German Bus Stop to Academy Award Nomination: The Honor Killing as 
Simulacrum, in GENDER, VIOLENCE, AND HUMAN SECURITY: CRITICAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 163, 166 
(Tripp et al. eds., 2013).  
 99 Stefanie E. Nanes, Fighting Honor Crimes: Evidence of Civil Society in Jordan, in DECONSTRUCTING 
SEXUALITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CHALLENGES AND DISCOURSES 65, 70 (Pinar Ilkkaracan ed., 2008).  
 100 EWING, supra note 34, at 170.  
 101 Pinar Ilkkaracan, Introduction to DECONSTRUCTING SEXUALITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CHALLENGES 
AND DISCOURSES 1, 3 (Pinar Ilkkaracan ed., 2008).  
 102 See Meetoo & Mirza, supra note 63, at 194.  
 103 POPE, supra note 57, at 29 (“For every honor murder that is reported, many more are disguised as 
accidents or suicides, and for every woman who is killed, there are dozens who live in fear and face the 
constant threat of violence.”).  
 104 Epstein, supra note 18, at 55.  
 105 See SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 140 (estimating Turkish honor killings between fifty and seventy-five).  
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Turkey—where Kurds predominantly reside.106 Additional research by Ceren 
Belge found that between 1974 and 2005, a total of 181 women had been 
murdered by their families in the southeastern province of Urfa alone.107 More 
recent estimates between 2009 and 2011 suggest that more than 200 honor 
killings occur annually in Turkey and that this number has reached a “record 
level.”108 Regardless of the actual number of honor killings reported, one fact 
remains undisputed: the statistical range severely underestimates the actual and 
widespread nature of the crime. 
Although the precise number of honor killings in Turkey and worldwide is 
unknown, these crimes have garnered increased media attention following the 
EU’s acceptance of Turkey’s bid for membership. Sparking public outrage 
unmatched by any other type of violence, honor killings have become a form 
of sensationalized murder in which the victim is depicted as “Western” and 
modernized, and the perpetrator is deemed barbaric and backward.109 This 
popular discourse has developed an ethnicized and gendered tone through 
mainstream media representations of the killing, and locates the victim and 
assailant in separate spaces along the modernization continuum.110 Particular 
forms of masculinity are thus constructed by the press as inherently threatening 
and terroristic, and these portrayals are used by the state to promote political 
agendas.111 In the West, these state agendas typically involve the 
modernization or assimilation of Islamic groups, and result in the crime being 
portrayed as a broad Muslim phenomenon.112 In Turkey, however, the prospect 
of EU accession has resulted in a substantially different ethnicization of the 
crime: it is purely a Kurdish problem. This section first provides a brief history 
of the Kurds in Turkey, setting the stage for understanding Turkey’s 
motivation for ethnicizing honor killings. Second, this section details the 
ethnicization of honor killings in Turkey, and analyzes honor killing perception 
within the country, particularly in the Turkish press. Finally, this section 
 
 106 Ince et al., supra note 16, at 539; Dicle Kogacioglu, The Tradition Effect: Framing Honor Crimes in 
Turkey, 15 J. FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD. 118, 129–30 (2004).  
 107 Belge, supra note 65, at 55.  
 108 ‘Honor Killings’ Have Morphed into ‘Honor Suicides’ in Turkey, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 27, 2009), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/27/honor-killings-have-morph_n_179928.html.  
 109 LILA ABU-LUGHOD, DO MUSLIM WOMEN NEED SAVING? 114 (2013).  
 110 See Ewing, supra note 98, at 167; Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 130; Montoya & Agustín, supra note 
83, at 534–40.  
 111 See EWING, supra note 34, at 170–71.  
 112 See, e.g., Bethany Corbin, A Bleeding Sin: An Examination of Honor Killings in Turkey and Germany 
93–108 (May 10, 2011) (unpublished B.A. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (on file with 
author).  
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summarizes the EU’s response to these killings in light of Turkey’s accession 
prospects and provides the background for understanding Turkey’s revised 
Penal Code. 
A. The Kurds 
The relationship between Turkey and its Kurdish citizens is one of 
complexity, brutality, and repression. Recently termed Turkey’s “Kurdish 
problem,”113 the interaction between Turks and Kurds has been anything but 
peaceful. Until the late 1990s, the very existence of the Kurdish people within 
Turkey’s borders was considered a political crime.114 This portion of the 
Article offers a brief introduction into the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, and 
provides a foundation for comprehending honor killing portrayal and 
perception in Turkey. 
The Kurds, who live primarily in the southeastern portion of the country, 
represent Turkey’s largest ethnic minority and comprise twenty percent of the 
state’s population.115 Often described as “traditional” and “tribal,” the Kurds 
have gained international attention for refusing to adopt the mandatory Turkish 
identity.116 This unified Turkish identity developed in response to the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, which was associated with failed ethnic 
autonomy and diversity.117 As a reaction to this history, Mustafa Kemal 
(“Kemal”) created a uniform, national Turkish identity which he forced on all 
citizens living within the country’s borders.118 His goal “was to somehow 
manufacture a ‘single-bodied’ Turkish nation out of many Muslim entities.”119 
 
 113 Emrullah Uslu, Turkey’s Kurdish Problem: Steps Toward a Solution, 30 STUD. CONFLICT & 
TERRORISM 157, 157 (2007).  
 114 See id. at 158 (“Until recently, jail terms awaited Kurds who publicly asserted any form of Kurdish 
identity.”).  
 115 MIRELA BOGDANI, TURKEY AND THE DILEMMA OF EU ACCESSION 34 (2011).  
 116 See HENRI J. BARKEY & GRAHAM E. FULLER, TURKEY’S KURDISH QUESTION 10–12 (1998). 
 117 OMAR TASPINAR, KURDISH NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY: KEMALIST IDENTITY IN 
TRANSITION 38 (2005) (“Turkish nationalism, therefore, essentially emerged as a reaction to imperial 
disintegration, in an environment where imperial and multi-ethnic projects failed to instigate a sense of 
Ottoman patriotism.”); see Michael M. Gunter, Turkey’s Floundering EU Candidacy and Its Kurdish Problem, 
14 MIDDLE E. POL’Y 117, 120 (2007) [hereinafter Gunter, Floundering EU Candidacy] (“The seemingly 
obstinate refusal in the modern Republic of Turkey to admit that its citizens of Kurdish ethnic heritage 
constitute a minority can be . . . further understood against the background of the gradual disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire before the onslaughts of various nationalisms during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.”).  
 118 See TASPINAR, supra note 117, at 77–78.  
 119 ALI K. OZCAN, TURKEY’S KURDS: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PKK AND ABDULLAH ÖCALAN 
70 (2006). 
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As such, Kemal attempted to “Turkify” the ethnic minorities by demanding the 
relinquishment of all native customs, languages, and rituals.120 The Kurds, 
however, actively refused to adopt a purely Turkish identity and defied the 
state government.121 
In response to this resistance, Kemal and his successors initially denied the 
very existence of the Kurds.122 The government imposed settlement and 
language restrictions on the minority group and prohibited the use of the 
Kurdish language until the early 1990s.123 This ban on speaking Kurdish 
occurred at a time when only a small minority of Kurds (approximately four 
percent) spoke any Turkish.124 Even the term “Kurd” was banned from public 
use for decades.125 Human and minority rights were further withheld from the 
Kurds in an attempt to force the minority group into accepting the Turkish 
identity, and, “[a]s a result, the regularly repeated rhetoric of the state’s official 
view ‘demonstrates’ the absence . . . of Kurdish material and spiritual 
existence.”126 
This denial of both linguistic and human rights to the Kurdish ethnicity 
failed, however, to “Turkify” the Kurds as planned, and instead incited terrorist 
activity. Kurdish terrorism, which has plagued the Turkish state for more than 
twenty years, developed in direct response to the Turkish government’s 
oppressive regime.127 The Kurdistan Worker’s Party (“PKK”) represents the 
primary organization responsible for advocating armed conflict to achieve 
 
 120 Id. at 71; see Gunter, Floundering EU Candidacy, supra note 117, at 121 (explaining that the Turkish 
Constitution permits “Turkish authorities to incriminate nonviolent expressions of ethnic identity simply on the 
basis that they are contrary to the constitutional definition of ‘Turkish’ and a danger to the integrity of the 
state.”); see also Michael M. Gunter, The Kurdish Problem in Turkey, 42 MIDDLE E. J. 389, 391 (1988) 
[hereinafter Gunter, Kurdish Problem] (discussing the “Turkicization” of Kurdish villages and towns).  
 121 See TASPINAR, supra note 117, at 77–78. For  more detailed information of the history of the Kurdish 
uprising, see id. at 79–82. 
 122 Gunter, Kurdish Problem, supra note 120, at 398; Uslu, supra note 113, at 157.  
 123 See BOGDANI, supra note 115, at 34 (noting that speaking Kurdish was banned until the 1990s); 
TASPINAR, supra note 117, at 82 (discussing the Settlement Law of 1934: “The purpose of the Settlement Law 
was to move Kurds out of their native villages and into modernized Turkish cities in an attempt to promote 
assimilation and Turkification of the minority group.”); Mesut Yegen, “Prospective-Turks” or “Pseudo-
Citizens:” Kurds in Turkey, 63 MIDDLE E. J. 597, 600–04 (2009).  
 124 Gunter, Kurdish Problem, supra note 120, at 399.  
 125 See generally Yegen, supra note 123, at 605 (noting that the Turkish government banned all 
broadcasting in Kurdish and did so without ever referencing Kurds or their language by name).  
 126 OZCAN, supra note 119, at 71.  
 127 BOGDANI, supra note 115, at 35.  
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Kurdish sovereignty and independence.128 The PKK has enforced their radical 
agenda through raids and ambushes, and employed over 20,000 armed 
guerrillas in the southeastern provinces.129 One of the worst massacres 
committed by these Kurdish insurgents occurred on June 20, 1987, when the 
PKK struck the village of Pinarcik and killed over thirty people.130 Similar 
deadly attacks followed on July 11, 1987 and August 18, 1987.131 These 
violent uprisings forced the Turkish government to increase national security 
and sparked the establishment of a village guard system in the southeast to 
quell PKK resistance.132 Finally, a cease-fire was declared on August 1, 
1999.133 Yet, despite this formal truce, PKK terrorist attacks continued from 
2000 to 2003.134 
Following the “official” end to the cease-fire in June 2004,135 violence 
between the Turkish state and the PKK spiraled out of control in 2006. At least 
fifteen people died during the month of March alone in clashes between the 
Kurds and Turkish police.136 During this time, a second militant group, the 
Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (“TAK”), implemented bombings across western 
Turkey, particularly in tourist regions.137 More than a dozen people were killed 
in April 2006, and at least fifteen more died in October of that same year from 
PKK and TAK raids and assaults.138 This violence has escalated in recent 
years, with more than 700 dead in less than fourteen months throughout 2011 
and 2012.139 During one weekend alone in September 2012, “at least eight 
Turkish police officers and four soldiers were killed in two separate ambushes 
 
 128 TASPINAR, supra note 117, at 94, 97–98; see BOGDANI, supra note 115, at 35 (explaining that the PKK 
is a terrorist organization); Gunter, Kurdish Problem, supra note 120, at 395 (describing the PKK as 
supporting armed struggle and endorsing violence).  
 129 Doğu Ergil, PKK: Partiya Karkarên Kurdistan, in TERROR, INSURGENCY, AND THE STATE: ENDING 
PROTRACTED CONFLICTS 323, 348 (Marianee Heiberg et al. eds., 2007).  
 130 Gunter, Kurdish Problem, supra note 120, at 405.  
 131 Id. 
 132 See Yegen, supra note 123, at 604 (discussing increases in compulsory settlement on the grounds of 
national security).  
 133 Uslu, supra note 113, at 159.  
 134 Id. Today, the Turkish military does not perceive the PKK as a legitimate organization within the state 
and “therefore treats its cease-fires as meaningless.” Id. at 162.  
 135 Id. at 159.  
 136 See Turkey Timeline: A Chronology of Key Events, BBC NEWS (Mar. 22, 2012), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/europe/1023189.stm.  
 137 Id. 
 138 See id.  
 139 Ivan Watson & Yesim Comert, Report Says Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict has Turned More Violent, CNN 
(Sept. 18, 2012, 12:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/18/world/europe/turkey-war-within/.  
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in southeastern Turkey,” which the PKK quickly claimed responsibility for.140 
This extreme increase in violence has jeopardized any hopes of finding a quick 
resolution to the Kurdish problem, and has created unease for Turks and Kurds 
throughout the country.141 
B. The Ethnicization of Honor Killings: A Kurdish Crime 
The violent and terroristic activities of both the Turkish state and the PKK 
in response to the “Kurdish problem” have created a seemingly impenetrable 
divide between the Turks and their Kurdish neighbors. This conflict remains a 
point of concern for Turkey’s EU accession.142 Faced with addressing both 
human rights violations and Kurdish resistance in order to advance EU 
accession talks, Turkey has developed a novel method of singling out the 
Kurds as barbaric “others” in need of modernization and assimilation: the 
linkage of honor killings with the Kurdish minority. This connection between 
Kurds and honor crimes is reinforced through the media’s portrayal of the 
murders and the lack of broad Turkish and Muslim identifiers.143 Instead of 
perceiving the crime as a human rights violation, Turkey uses the press to 
portray honor killings as a purely Kurdish phenomenon in order to justify state 
intervention and modernization of the repressed ethnic minority.144 This 
section briefly details the linkage of honor killings with the Kurds and explores 
the rationales behind this association. 
Although honor killings represent global human rights violations, the 
Turkish state has worked diligently to construct the crime as belonging solely 
to the Kurdish culture. Articles and reports produced by the Turkish media and 
state organizations “approach the problem [of honor killings] through a 
regional context and tend to correlate it to the culture of the Kurdish and 
Arabic minorities for whom clan-based social formations are still 
dominant.”145 The press and public associate honor killings with the eastern 
and southeastern provinces of Turkey where the Kurds predominantly reside 
 
 140 Id. 
 141 See id.; see also Uslu, supra note 113, at 161 (discussing the obstacles facing resolution of the Kurdish 
problem).  
 142 Steven Cook & John Bardemas, Report Card: Turkey and EU Membership?: The Kurds, PBS (May 
14, 2008), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/turkeys-tigers/report-card-turkey-and-eu-membership/ 
the-kurds/838/.  
 143 See Corbin, supra note 112, at 60–63.  
 144 See id. at 63–74.  
 145 Ince et al., supra note 16, at 539.  
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and where tribal social structures stand strong.146 Any honor killing 
occurrences in the northern and western portions of Turkey are quickly linked 
to Kurdish migration to these cities.147 In this manner, the Turkish state draws 
a distinct “us versus them” boundary in which Kurds who have resided in 
Turkey for generations are deemed fundamentally “other” and alien within 
their own homeland. 
Specifically, an examination of honor killing portrayal in the Turkish press 
illuminates the linkage of honor killings with the Kurdish minority. A study on 
honor killing categorization in Turkish English-language newspapers found 
that honor killings were associated with Kurds and their location in 
southeastern Turkey approximately seven times more than they were 
associated with Muslims and Turks in general.148 Rarely was an honor killing 
ascribed broadly with Muslims or the Turkish population. Instead, the reporters 
who detailed these honor killings repeatedly noted the perpetrator’s Kurdish 
heritage and referenced the archaic and patriarchal characteristics of both 
Kurds in general and the southeastern provinces of Turkey in which they 
lived.149 For example, journalist Gündüz Aktan (“Aktan”) described the 
Kurdish community as having “failed to modernize” and integrate with the rest 
of Turkish society.150 Reporter Göksel Bozkurt took these characterizations 
further and explained that “honor killings were specific to Turkey’s eastern and 
southeastern regions and that they were tied to backward standards and the 
effects of poverty.”151 In 2006, Aktan even applauded “Western” media for 
realizing that honor killings were related to ethnic Kurds “and that both honor 
killings and the tribal system are phenomena particular to the Southeast of the 
country.”152 In Aktan’s view, the words “Kurdish” and “Turkish” should not be 
used interchangeably when the honor crimes occur in the southeastern region 
 
 146 Kuraner, supra note 65, at 28; Mora, supra note 15, at 506.  
 147 Ince et al., supra note 16, at 544–45.  
 148 Corbin, supra note 112, at 56–61.  
 149 Id. at 61–63; see, e.g., Kuraner, supra note 65, at 28 (“In the case of Turkey, the custom originates 
from the Southeastern and Eastern Regions, where a majority of the population consists of people of Kurdish 
ethnic origin.”); Mora, supra note 15, at 506 (noting that honor killings are “[o]bserved especially in the 
Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey” where tribal social structure still exists).  
 150 Gündüz Aktan, Intellectuals and the Kurdish Identity, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (Jun. 21, 2004), http:// 
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=intellectuals-and-the-kurdish-identity-2004-06-21.  
 151 Göksel Bozkurt, ‘Honor Killings’ Reflect Society as a Whole, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (Nov. 20, 2005, 
12:00 AM), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=honor-killings-reflect-society-as-
a-whole-2005-11-20.  
 152 Gündüz Aktan, The Tribal System, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (Nov. 4, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www. 
hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=the-tribal-system-2006-11-04.  
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of Turkey.153 These descriptions of Kurds—and the repeated references to their 
socioeconomic conditions—in connection with honor killings serve to locate 
honor crimes within a geographically bounded spatiality that excludes the 
general Turkish population. 
Scholars similarly endorse this view by imposing generalized feudal and 
patriarchal characteristics on the Kurdish dominated southeast. According to 
Necla Mora, honor killings are “observed especially in the Eastern and 
Southeastern regions of Turkey” where “[p]reserving honor and glory comes 
first in the system of values.”154 Comparably, Efsa Kuraner articulates that the 
custom of honor killing “originates from the Southeastern and Eastern regions, 
where a majority of the population consists of people of Kurdish ethnic 
origin.”155 Kuraner proceeds to describe these regions as endorsing oppressive 
patriarchal views of women’s sexuality and promoting “gender discriminatory 
traditions and practices.”156 Thus, prominent scholars, including Pinar 
Ilkkaracan, Hilal Ince, Efsa Kuraner, Necla Mora, Aysan Sev’er, and 
Gökçeçiçek Yurdakul, all identify a connection between honor crimes and 
Kurdish clans.157 
By isolating honor killings in the southeastern provinces, Turkish reporters 
and state organizations have ethnicized the crime and attributed it primarily to 
a disadvantaged minority group.158 The depiction of Kurds as conservative, 
ignorant, homogenous, and tribal suggests that this ethnicity has failed to 
modernize and that its ideals and customs are incompatible with a modern, 
“westernized” country.159 Mesut Yegen even suggests that “[t]he status of 
 
 153 See id. 
 154 See Mora, supra note 15, at 506–07.  
 155 Kuraner, supra note 65, at 28.  
 156 Id.  
 157 See Pinar Ilkkaracan, How Adultery Almost Derailed Turkey’s Aspirations to Join the European 
Union, in SEX POLITICS: REPORTS FROM THE FRONTLINES 247, 261–62 (Parker E., Petchesky R. & Sembler R. 
eds., 2007) (“[T]he term ‘custom killings’ is associated primarily with a practice more prevalent in eastern and 
southeastern Turkey, in the context of a semi-feudal traditional agricultural economy and among a 
predominantly Kurdish population.”); Ince et al., supra note 16, at 544 (“In Turkey, customary killings 
commonly occur in villages or large enclaves where Arabian or Kurdish clans exist.”); see Kuraner, supra note 
65, at 28 (“[The] custom originates from the Southeastern and Eastern Regions, where a majority of the 
population consists of people of Kurdish ethnic origin.”); see generally Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 
970 (noting that “[r]ural populations [in Turkey], especially in eastern regions, often occupy the lowest rungs 
on the socioeconomic ladder, are most likely to be undereducated or illiterate, and are most vulnerable to 
religious and cultural misconceptions or even extremism,” which causes unforgiving patriarchal expectations 
of gender relations).  
 158 Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 130.  
 159 See Corbin, supra note 112, at 74.  
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Kurds vis a vis Turkishness is now much closer to that of non-Muslims” than 
to Muslims and Turks.160 This discursive isolation of honor killings enables the 
Turkish state not only to disassociate itself from the murders, but also to target 
Kurds for forced assimilation and integration programs. Given the active and 
violent resistance of Kurds to adopting a uniform Turkish identity, 
governmental efforts to assimilate the Kurds remain a high priority.161 
Particularly, the Turkish government’s strategy of “otherization” has 
helped to diminish national support for the Kurds and has increased their 
alienation within society.162 By constructing the Kurds as social outcasts, 
Turkey sets the stage for upcoming modernization and assimilation projects 
that target the Kurds. Describing the southeastern territory as undeveloped, 
feudal, and tribal enables Turkey to link the Kurds to these characteristics 
simply through their place of residence. In doing so, Turkey portrays the Kurds 
as fundamentally different from the rest of society and in need of both 
modernized values and infrastructure. This depiction of Kurds combined with 
international pressure for Turkey to address its Kurdish problem has provided 
another opportunity for “Turkification.” 
Finally, the perception of honor killings as a purely Kurdish phenomenon 
in Turkey is no doubt partly triggered by Turkey’s repeated attempts to gain 
membership into the European Union. Turkey’s inability to deny the existence 
of these heinous crimes has inflamed the “Western” consciousness and caused 
the EU to recognize these killings as an impediment to integration.163 
According to journalist Fulya Özerkan, “The practice of honor killings has 
long marred Turkey’s drive to improve women’s rights, a key demand of the 
European Union.”164 By stigmatizing the Kurdish ethnicity as backward, 
barbaric, inhuman, and essentially non-Muslim, Turkey constructs an “us-
versus-them” divide in which it removes itself from the crime altogether. This 
perceived spatial distance absolves the state of any responsibility for the 
murders and places Turkey in line with the EU in attempting to eradicate the 
crime. 
 
 160 Yegen, supra note 123, at 610.  
 161 See BOGDANI, supra note 115, at 34–35. 
 162 See Corbin, supra note 112, at 50.  
 163 Id. at 11.  
 164 Fulya Özerkan, UN Urges Probe on Suicide Cases Among Women, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (June 4, 
2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=un-urges-probe-on-suicide-cases-among-
women-2006-06-04.  
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C. European Union Pressure to Eliminate Honor Killings in Turkey 
The Turkish state’s separation from honor killings, regardless of motive, 
has become crucial in the battle for EU accession. Despite the existence of 
honor killings in Turkey for decades, the crime only recently garnered 
international attention and interest due to Turkey’s EU membership 
prospects.165 These sensationalized stories of honor killings help distinguish 
the crime from ordinary domestic violence, and arouse anger among the 
citizens of “Western” nations.166 Frequently cited as an excuse to delay 
accession negotiations, Turkey’s flawed human rights record, which includes 
honor crimes, has become a recurring impediment to EU membership.167 In an 
attempt to remedy its human rights deficit, the Turkish state has initiated 
radical legal reforms in response to EU demand.168 This section provides a 
succinct introduction to Turkey’s history with the EU, and illustrates how EU 
pressure stimulated the revisions in Turkey’s Penal Code, which is discussed in 
Section III. 
Long perceived as an “awkward candidate” for EU membership, Turkey’s 
trajectory for accession has been arduous and strained. Currently, Turkey 
remains the only candidate country that has not received a timetable for 
accession.169 Although Turkey’s candidacy for membership was officially 
recognized in December 1999 at the Helsinki Council, this recognition 
followed decades of negotiation talks and agreements between Turkey and the 
EU: 
Turkey applied for associate membership in the EU—then the EEC—
as early as 1959. The application resulted in an Association 
Agreement in 1963, whereby Turkey and the EU would conditionally 
and gradually create a customs union by 1995 at the latest. The 
customs union was seen as a step towards full membership at an 
unspecified future date. The EU unilaterally granted Turkey 
preferential tariffs and financial assistance, but the process of staged, 
mutual reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers was delayed in the 
1970s because of economic and political conditions in Turkey. 
 
 165 See Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 134 . 
 166 See ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 109, at 7–8.  
 167 See Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, at 42, COM 
(2013) 700 final (Oct. 16, 2013). 
 168 See generally MINISTRY FOR EU AFF., REPUBLIC OF TURK., THE TURKISH NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR 
THE ADOPTION OF THE ACQUIS (2007–2013) [hereinafter TURKISH NATIONAL PROGAMME FOR THE ADOPTION 
OF THE ACQUIS], available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=6&l=2.  
 169 Sübidey Togan, Turkey: Toward EU Accession, 27 THE WORLD ECON. 1013, 1013 (2004). 
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Turkey [then] applied for full membership in 1987. The response in 
1990 was that accession negotiations could not be undertaken at the 
time, since the EU was engaged in major internal changes as well as 
in the transition of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. . . . A 
breakthrough came at the Helsinki meeting of the European Council 
in 1999, when Turkey attained status as a candidate for 
membership.170 
Notwithstanding this official recognition, the first Accession Partnership 
Agreement for Turkey did not materialize until March 2001, and was later 
revised in 2003 and 2006.171 During these interim periods, Turkey was advised 
to prepare a national program for the adoption of all EU standards, including a 
realistic timetable for achieving all Accession Partnership requirements.172 
This included altering Turkey’s existing legislation in order to adopt the acquis 
communautaire, which is the legal framework of the EU.173 Turkey responded 
on March 19, 2001, by presenting its National Program, which included a five-
hundred page document outlining Turkey’s intended reforms to harmonize its 
economic, social, and political policies with those of the EU.174 To date, 
however, Turkey has opened only thirteen of the thirty-five chapters in its 
negotiations, and has closed only one of those chapters.175 Eight chapters were 
frozen in 2006 due to Turkey’s “non-implementation of the Additional 
Protocol to its customs union agreement, which concerned the opening of 
Turkish ports and airports to Cypriot-flagged vessels and flights.”176 This 
persistent refusal to enforce the Additional Protocol further resulted in the EU 
vetoing another five chapters.177 In addition to these economic and political 
setbacks, the European Commission has expressed continued concern with 
Turkey’s human rights framework, causing further delay in Turkey’s EU 
accession talks. 
 
 170 Id. 
 171 Rebecca Boon, They Killed Her for Going Out with Boys: Honor Killings in Turkey in Light of 
Turkey’s Accession to the European Union and Lessons for Iraq, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 815, 824 (2006); see 
generally Council Decision 2006/35/EC, On the Principles, Priorities and Conditions Contained in the 
Accession Partnership with Turkey, 2006 O.J. (L22) [hereinafter Accession Partnership]. 
 172 See generally Accession Partnership, supra note 171. 
 173 Togan, supra note 169, at 1013.  
 174 See generally TURKISH NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE ACQUIS, supra note 168.  
 175 Nathalie Tocci, Unblocking Turkey’s EU Accession, 12 INSIGHT TURKEY 27, 27–28 (2010).  
 176 Id. at 28.  
 177 Id. 
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Among the economic, political, and democratic standards required for 
Turkey to adopt is the Copenhagen Criteria.178 The Copenhagen Criteria exists 
as a document that must be ratified by all EU candidate members and ensures 
guarantees of democracy and human rights.179 As part of this criteria, a 
member state must satisfy three prongs: (1) the creation of a functioning 
market economy; (2) adherence to the EU’s political, economic, and monetary 
union; and (3) the promotion of stable institutions that guarantee democracy 
and human rights.180 This third requirement, also termed the political prong, 
encompasses human, minority, and women’s rights.181 While Turkey’s efforts 
to fulfill these provisions were initially widely praised by both the EU and the 
United States in 2003,182 the EU nonetheless expressed repeated dissatisfaction 
regarding Turkey’s treatment of women and minorities in subsequent years. 
Specifically, the EU’s 2005 Progress Report noted an extreme lack of 
advancement by Turkish officials with regards to improving women’s rights. 
Evidence of Turkey’s failure to reform women’s rights was found specifically 
in the area of honor killings, which remained “a matter of serious concern.”183 
Both the Special Rapporteur on violence against women and the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions expressed 
apprehension over Turkey’s misrepresentation and underreporting of honor 
crimes.184 In the first eight months of 2006 alone, the European Court of 
Human Rights (“ECHR”) issued 198 judgments stating that Turkey was in 
violation of at least one ECHR article.185 Additionally, EU officials raised 
legitimate criticism that the Turkish Penal Code provided lenient sentences to 
perpetrators of honor crimes, and that the Turkish state had essentially become 
 
 178 See Diane Hickey, The As Yet Unfulfilled Promise and Potential of European Union Human Rights 
Law, WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 647, 667–68 (2009). 
 179 Boon, supra note 171, at 824.  
 180 Elif Üçer, Turkey’s Accession to the European Union, 38 FUTURES 197, 200 (2006).  
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 182 See Hickey, supra note 178, at 668.  
 183 Turkey: 2005 Progress Report, at 32, COM (2005) 561 final (Nov. 9, 2005).  
 184 See Yakin Ertürk, Human Rights Council, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 
15 March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council” Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women, its Causes and Consequences, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/34/Add.2 (Jan. 5, 2007); see also Christof 
Heyns, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47/Add.2 (Mar. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur on 
Executions Report].  
 185 William Chislett, The EU’s Progress Report on Turkey’s Accession: Derailment or Shunted into a 
Siding?, REAL INSTITUTO ELCANO, at 4 (Nov. 13, 2006), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/ 
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complicit in such killings.186 These concerns were echoed in the 2007 Progress 
Report for Turkey, which noted continued inadequacies in Turkey’s protection 
and enforcement of human rights.187 
Turkey’s difficulty in improving human rights has become a repeated 
criticism of the EU today and remains a “major stumbling block in 
negotiations.”188 The most recent 2013 Progress Report complained that 
“[d]omestic violence, occasional honour killings and the issue of early and 
forced marriages remain a serious concern” in Turkey’s accession talks.189 
Many EU member states continue to perceive Turkey as a highly patriarchal 
society with oppressive gender stereotypes ingrained in its social fabric.190 
These shortcomings must be addressed in order to bring Turkey in line with 
European standards. 
The negative publicity associated with Turkey’s treatment of minorities and 
women has served not only to stall negotiation talks, but has also caused EU 
member states to actively resist Turkey’s bid for membership. The linkage of 
honor killings with Turkey—and, by association, Muslims in general—led 
critics to argue that Muslim immigrants from Turkey would be unable to 
“integrate because Islam is inassimilable and therefore a threat to a ‘European 
identity.’”191 These stereotypes were further fueled by the tragedy of 9/11, 
which categorized all Muslim men as terrorists and all Muslim women as 
victims of male domination and oppression.192 This heightened the perceived 
incompatibility of Islam and Christianity, drawing further attention to the 
cultural uniqueness of honor killings during Turkey’s attempted accession.193 
Thus, the EU began to place increased pressure on Turkey to strengthen its 
human rights law, and mandated certain reforms to the Turkish Penal Code as 
a key element of future accession negotiations.194 
 
 186 See Special Rapporteur on Executions Report, supra note 184, ¶ 46. 
 187 Hickey, supra note 178, at 668.  
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 190 See BOGDANI, supra note 115, at 30, 47.  
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III.  HONOR KILLINGS UNDER THE TURKISH PENAL CODE 
In direct response to EU criticism, Turkey implemented legislative reforms 
in September 2004.195 These modifications sparked initial optimism within the 
EU, and represented an attempt to harmonize Turkey’s legal framework with 
existing EU laws.196 As part of these revisions, Turkey adopted extensive 
human rights legislation designed to “crack down” on honor killings.197 By 
implementing these reforms and simultaneously portraying honor killings as a 
purely Kurdish phenomenon, Turkey successfully distanced itself from these 
heinous human rights violations. However, an unanticipated consequence of 
this top-down transformation was the accusation by scholars and reporters that 
honor killings had merely transformed into honor suicides. This section 
analyzes the revisions of the Turkish Penal Code with respect to honor killings, 
and highlights the important changes in criminal sentencing that caused 
scholars to link this metamorphosis with the revised Penal Code. 
A. The Former Turkish Penal Code and Legal Pluralism 
In 1926, Turkey adopted its first modern Penal Code, which was modeled 
substantially after the Italian Criminal Code of 1889.198 Referred to now as the 
“former” or “old” Penal Code, this set of laws existed until Turkey’s adoption 
of the new criminal code in late 2004. Under this former code, honor killings 
became a type of state-sanctioned femicide in which the Turkish government 
offered complicity in the murders.199 Such complicity was evidenced by 
Turkish penal provisions “that explicitly offer[ed] perpetrators of crimes of 
honour exoneration from their actions, with the honour motif as mitigation.”200 
Turkish judicial decisions under this code thus recognized and provided 
mitigation for criminal sentences based on honor or “custom” murders, 
implicitly legitimizing the killings. These lenient provisions remained in effect 
until EU officials threatened to halt accession talks unless perpetrators faced 
harsher sanctions. 
 
 195 Ertürk, supra note 184, at para. 55.  
 196 E.g., Hickey, supra note 178, at 668. 
 197 Id. at 669.  
 198 Adnan Güriz, Sources of Turkish Law, in INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH LAW 1, 9 (Tuğrul Ansay & Don 
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 199 Arin, supra note 50, at 823; see Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 987. 
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Under the former Penal Code, the punishment for intentional murder was a 
minimum sentence of twenty-four years imprisonment.201 When the intentional 
murder was committed against family members, parents, or children, or was 
premeditated, the perpetrator received capital punishment under Articles 449 
and 450.202 Provided that honor killings are premeditated intentional murders 
against family members, the minimum allowable punishment under the former 
Penal Code should have been life imprisonment without the possibility for 
parole in cases brought after 2004 and capital punishment for cases brought 
prior to 2004.203 
Despite the clarity of these textbook sentences, most honor killing 
perpetrators rarely spent more than twenty years in prison under the former 
code, and acquittals were surprisingly common. In Siverek, for example, 
“nearly half of all honor killing cases tried in courts between 1996 and 2004 
(44.4 percent) resulted in acquittal and the average sentence length for every 
woman murdered was 10.2 years.”204 Similar data was obtained in Urfa 
between 1974 and 2005, where the average sentence for an honor killing was 
18.2 years in prison; however, the actual time served by most perpetrators was 
less than thirteen years, with a steady acquittal rate of twenty percent.205 Only 
seven percent of perpetrators in Urfa received life sentences or capital 
punishment.206 In Turkey overall, sentences were lowest from 1974 to 1989, 
with the average perpetrator spending less than 11.1 years in prison, and 
increased gradually from 1996 to 2005, where the average sentence became 
15.7 years in prison.207 While the acquittal rate decreased overall from twenty-
four percent in 1990 to eighteen percent in 2005, the acquittal rate for under-
aged perpetrators remained constant.208 
The high acquittal rates and low sentences for honor killing perpetrators 
were the direct result of Articles 462, 51, 29, and 59 of the former Penal Code. 
These articles worked in conjunction to afford perpetrators substantial penalty 
 
 201 WIKAN, supra note 39, at 82 (describing the typical punishment for murder as either life imprisonment 
or execution); see Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 123.  
 202 Belge, supra note 65, at 50.  
 203 Turkey provisionally abolished the death penalty in 2002 and abolished it completely in 2004. Daren 
Butler, Erdogan Moots Restoring Death Penalty in Turkey, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2012, 8:26 AM), http://www. 
reuters.com/article/2012/11/12/us-turkey-erdogan-deathpenalty-idUSBRE8AB0K620121112.  
 204 Belge, supra note 65, at 93.  
 205 See generally id. at 55–73.  
 206 Id. 
 207 See id. at 73.  
 208 Id. 
CORBIN GALLEYSPROOFS2 11/18/2014  11:18 AM 
2014] BETWEEN SAVIORS AND SAVAGES 305 
reductions in the event of prosecution. Articles 462 and 29 of the former Penal 
Code defined usage of the provocation defense and offered sentence reductions 
of up to seven-eighths in cases of provoked homicide.209 Specifically, Article 
462 covered instances of special aggravating provocation and applied primarily 
to situations where the perpetrator discovered that a first-degree relative was 
involved in an illicit or pre-marital relationship.210 Honor crimes were thus 
typically presented as homicides committed in the heat of passion, and were 
treated under Articles 462 and 29 as cases of unjust provocation. Article 462 
even explicitly reduced a perpetrator’s punishment to one-eighth of the original 
sentence.211 The combination of Articles 462 and 29 typically resulted in the 
acquittal of murderous perpetrators despite the lapse in time between the affair 
and the killing. In fact, these provocation defenses were granted in 
approximately sixty-three percent of cases in which they were applicable.212 
Furthermore, Article 462 was often used in combination with Article 51, 
which served as a general mitigation clause.213 Article 51 reduced a 
perpetrator’s sentence by up to two-thirds if the individual committed 
homicide as a result of uncontrollable grief or provocation.214 When upheld, 
this defense offered an additional two-thirds penalty reduction in conjunction 
with the seven-eighths reduction afforded by Article 462.215 Similarly, Article 
59 permitted a judge, in his or her sole discretion, to further reduce a 
perpetrator’s sentence by one-sixth.216 These sentence reductions, combined 
with the minimum age for prosecution, made it extremely difficult for the 
Turkish judicial system to effectively prosecute honor killing perpetrators 
under the age of eighteen.217 Thus, the Turkish state was deemed complicit in 
crimes of honor for its failure to harshly and effectively prosecute the 
perpetrators and eradicate the offense under the former Penal Code. 
These mitigating provisions cannot, however, be analyzed in a vacuum, and 
the key to understanding these sentence reductions lies in the existence of legal 
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pluralism within Turkish society. Defined at its basic core as the existence of 
multiple legal systems in one geographic area, legal pluralism challenges the 
traditional notion of “law” as a solitary system.218 “To put it simply, legal 
pluralism recognizes multiple forms of ordering and bodies of rules which may 
be central to the lives of individuals but which are not dependent upon the state 
or state law for recognition or legitimacy.”219 Legal pluralism thus creates a 
space in which law and culture blend to erode the ideal of a single, textually 
explicit source of law. 
In Turkey, legal pluralism was acknowledged and endorsed by judges from 
all legal circuits, and blurred the boundary between state law and familial 
rights.220 Although the Turkish state espoused a solidified and unitary legal 
system, the unspoken reality was that the state was not the sole source of law 
and authority in Turkish society. Rather, Turkish courts recognized a family’s 
de facto right to control and punish its own members, and shared legal power 
with the family unit.221 This sharing of authority facilitated the judicial 
perception of honor killings as regional and familial customs that should be 
subjected to lenient criminal sanctions.222 Specifically, “[t]he framing of honor 
killings as ‘regional custom’ opened the way for both pluralist arguments for 
mitigating sentences based on the cultural background of the accused, and for 
legal centralist arguments on the supremacy of state law over custom.”223 This 
legal discourse defined a broader pattern of the state’s relationship with clan 
families, and led to the relinquishment of substantial judicial control over the 
family unit as a whole. 
This bifurcated legal system arose partly from Turkey’s rotating officer 
system and the state officials’ unfamiliarity with Kurdish language and 
politics. In an effort to promote employee loyalty towards the state, the Turkish 
elites limited the term for a judicial officer in Eastern or Southeastern Turkey 
to less than three years.224 This rotating placement kept judicial and law 
enforcement officials purposefully ignorant of the communities in which they 
served. As a result, state officials came to view the Kurdish communities as 
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dangerous and separate from the mainstream Turkish population.225 Poised to 
consider the Kurdish ethnicity as inherently alien, officials readily accepted 
arguments that women in these regions were bound by familial customs that 
should be handled within the family.226 Laws implemented in Eastern Turkey 
emphasized that conduct should be viewed in light of regional practices and 
family expectations.227 Thus, the centrality and uniformity of the legal system 
began to break down and ushered in a defining era of legal pluralism. 
B. The Revised Turkish Penal Code—A Step in the Right Direction 
The reign of legal pluralism began its slow demise in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s as judicial officers noted incompatibilities between family customs 
and state law.228 This shift unsurprisingly coincided with the politicization of 
the Kurdish-Turkish boundary.229 Faced with the Kurdish uprising and demand 
for autonomy, the Turkish government imposed stringent laws aimed at 
repressing the Kurdish minority.230 However, as Turkey’s EU accession 
negotiations gained momentum, the state was forced to recognize the Kurdish 
ethnicity and improve both minority and human rights. 
In direct response to EU pressure and growing outrage over Turkey’s 
lenient honor provisions, the Turkish government expedited legislative change 
in 2004 by revising the Turkish Penal Code.231 Modified in accordance with 
the Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey’s new Penal Code “resulted in a sudden shift 
from laws that arguably protect honor killing and are strongly gender-
discriminatory to a new penal code and constitutional amendments, which . . . 
reject honorable motives as justification for murder.”232 Thus, the new Penal 
Code envisioned heavy prison terms—even life sentences—for homicide 
motivated by custom and honor. 
 
 225 Abu-Lughod, Seductions, supra note 81, at 46.  
 226 For example, Turkish judges invoked “regional traditions” and “customs” as explanations for their 
sentence reductions. See Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 124 (noting that judges view honor crimes as “the 
result of ‘an unlucky turn of tradition,’ a case of ‘traditions getting out of hand.’” These judges “saw their 
colleagues as ‘appropriately’ taking social norms into consideration when judging.”). 
 227 Id. at 124.  
 228 See Belge, supra note 65, at 55–57.  
 229 See id.  
 230 See id.  
 231 The Turkish Penal Code was officially promulgated on September 26, 2004. See generally TÜRK CEZA 
KANUNU [TURKISH PENAL CODE] Sep. 26, 2004, Kanun 5237, (Turk.). 
 232 Vitoshka, supra note 55, at 23. 
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In particular, Article 462 of the unrevised Penal Code, which provided a 
mitigating defense for homicide in conjunction with Article 51, was 
revoked.233 Comparably, Article 29 of the unrevised code, which reduced 
penalties in the event of “unjust provocation,” was substantially amended to 
clarify its inapplicability to honor killings.234 According to revised Article 29, 
“family members and relatives who commit honor killings . . . cannot benefit 
from a reduction [of penalty.]”235 Additionally, Article 82, which discusses 
aggravating circumstances for homicide, was revised to include “custom” 
killings,236 and Article 453 was amended to impose heavier sanctions for honor 
killings of children.237 Under revised Article 453, the imprisonment term 
increased from a maximum of eight years to a maximum of twelve years.238 
Similarly, Article 457 increased the penalty by an additional one-third to one-
half of the original sentence if the violence was committed against a family 
member.239 Where the perpetrator stands in a guardian relationship with the 
victim (i.e. parent), Articles 414 through 416 mandate that the proscribed 
punishment be doubled.240 
The most important revision to the Penal Code, however, came in the form 
of Article 38. Article 38 provides that the perpetrator of an honor killing—
typically the youngest brother—and the family council responsible for the 
decision to commit the crime are to be punished equally.241 The effect of this 
article is to eliminate the immunity that family councils and young perpetrators 
once enjoyed. Members of a dishonored family can no longer select the 
youngest male to commit the murder and escape from punishment. Rather, the 
 
 233 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 182. Article 51, however, remains in effect “and again has been used to 
reduce the punishment for [honor killings] by as much as a third.” Id. 
 234 Vitoshka, supra note 55, at 23; see TÜRK CEZA KANUNU [TURKISH PENAL CODE] Sep. 26, 2004, 
Kanun 5237, art. 29 (Turk.). 
 235 Vitoshka, supra note 55, at 23; see TÜRK CEZA KANUNU [TURKISH PENAL CODE] Sep. 26, 2004, art. 
29 (Turk.). 
 236 ELA ANIL ET AL., TURKISH CIVIL AND PENAL CODE REFORMS FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE : THE 
SUCCESS OF TWO NATIONWIDE CAMPAIGNS 63 (1st ed. 2005). See generally WIKAN, supra note 39, at 82 
(stating that honor killings “are seen as an aggravated circumstance for murder crimes”); e.g., TÜRK CEZA 
KANUNU [TURKISH PENAL CODE] Sep. 26, 2004, Kanun 5237, art. 82 (Turk.). 
 237 Boon, supra note 171, at 836.  
 238 Id. at 836.  
 239 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 176.  
 240 Id. at 178.  
 241 ANIL ET AL., supra note 236, at 63; see TÜRK CEZA KANUNU [TURKISH PENAL CODE] Sep. 26, 2004, 
Kanun 5237, art. 38 (Turk.). 
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entire family is tried and sentenced without the leniency of the unrevised Penal 
Code.242 
Although Turkey has taken commendable legislative and judicial action on 
paper to eradicate honor killings, sentencing still remains largely within the 
discretion of the judge.243 Textual changes to the law cannot simply eliminate 
the patriarchal and cultural biases that may influence a judge’s decision-
making process.244 “Even when an institution operates legally or efficiently, 
the undermining of women’s rights may be an integral part of its daily modus 
operandi or its ideological structure.”245 Most judges in Turkey remain social 
conservatives who interpret the law as offering light punishments to honor 
killers despite these amendments.246 Such an understanding of the law is 
legitimized on the ground that the term “honor killing” never once appears in 
the Turkish Penal Code.247 Rather, the Penal Code references “custom killing,” 
which judges may differentiate on a purely technical basis from honor killing. 
According to KA-MER, one of the largest women’s groups in Turkey focused 
on combatting honor killings, “[t]he law has changed, but you don’t see it yet 
in the courts when verdicts are handed out. Judges don’t always follow the new 
laws, they follow their own feelings too.”248 Therefore, while Turkey has 
achieved substantial progress in terms of legal reformation, the practical effect 
on daily activities is uncertain. 
 
 242 See Hickey, supra note 178, at 669; see also TÜRK CEZA KANUNU [TURKISH PENAL CODE] Sep. 26, 
2004, Kanun 5237, art. 38 (Turk.). 
 243 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 181.  
 244 See Gareth Jones, Turkey Faces Battle to Stamp Out ‘Honor Killings’, ASSYRIAN INT’L NEWS AGENCY 
(Apr. 7, 2006), http://www.aina.org/news/20060407001803.htm (highlighting that “[a]lthough welcome, 
tougher laws barely begin to tackle the deep social and cultural roots of honor killings.”); see also Leyla 
Pervizat, In the Name of Honor, CARNEGIE COUNCIL FOR ETHICS IN INT’L AFFAIRS, http://www. 
carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/dialogue/2_10/articles/1058.html/:pf_printable (last accessed Mar. 9, 
2014) [hereinafter Pervizat, In the Name of Honor] (“Violence against women is legitimized by the attitudes of 
state actors, many mainstream human rights activists, and Turkish society at large because ultimately gender 
imbalances are the status quo.”).  
 245 Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 121.  
 246 Europe: An UnEuropean Habit: Honour Killings in Turkey, THE ECONOMIST, June 28, 2003, at 53 
[hereinafter An UnEuropean Habit].  
 247 Leyla Pervizat, Lack of Due Diligence: Judgments of Crimes of Honour in Turkey, in HONOUR, 
VIOLENCE, WOMEN AND ISLAM 142, 151 (Mohammad M. Idriss & Tahir Abbas eds., 2011); Derya Tekin, 
Victims of Law: The Efficiency of Turkish Penal System on Honour Killings, STRATEGIC OUTLOOK 12–13 
(Nov. 2012), http://www.strategicoutlook.org/publications/victims_of_law_the_efficiency_of_turkish_penal_ 
system_on_honour_killings.pdf.  
 248 Jones, supra note 244 (quoting a representative from KA-MER) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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IV. THE METAMORPHOSIS OF HONOR KILLINGS INTO HONOR SUICIDES—IS 
THE REVISED TURKISH PENAL CODE TO BLAME? 
While the workable reality of Turkey’s new Penal Code remains unsettled, 
it is undeniable that these laudable changes have failed to reduce honor killings 
in any appreciable manner. Though honor killing perpetrators face harsh 
prosecution under the revised Penal Code for committing an honor crime, the 
prospect of imprisonment has allegedly only altered the form of honor killings 
instead of eradicating them. According to scholars, the phenomenon of “honor 
suicide” emerged simultaneously with the adoption of the new Penal Code as a 
method for cleansing family honor without risking criminal punishment.249 
Rather than electing the youngest male to perform the murder, Turkish families 
have now begun to urge the tainted females to take their own lives and spare 
their families the loss of two members—one in death and one in prison.250 
When viewed in conjunction with worldwide trends in suicide, scholars argue 
that the causal connection between the Penal Code revisions and the 
transformation of honor killings into honor suicides is undeniable.251 The 
problem with this bold assertion, however, is that scholars have failed to take 
into account honor suicides that occurred under the former Penal Code, and 
have not provided statistical data to demonstrate a marked increase in female 
suicides after the revised code’s adoption. This section traces the 
metamorphosis of honor killings into honor suicides and challenges the widely 
held belief that Turkey’s legal revisions caused this transformation. 
A. In Support of Causation: The Link Between the Revised Penal Code and 
Honor Suicides 
Prior to the Penal Code revisions in 2004, honor suicides were rarely 
mentioned in Turkish and international news. The depth of coverage for honor 
suicides extended only to the mere mention of honor killings occasionally 
being disguised as suicides.252 Statistics and detailed information regarding 
these suicides were unavailable, and the act garnered little media attention. The 
term “honor suicide” remained a relatively undefined phrase in literature and 
scholarship. Following the adoption of the new Penal Code in late 2004, 
 
 249 See, e.g., Cohan, supra note 15, at 193; Kuraner, supra note 65, at 28–29; see also Daniel Howden, 
UN Investigates ‘Forced Suicides’ in Turkey, THE INDEPENDENT (May 25, 2006), http://www.independent.co. 
uk/news/world/europe/un-investigates-forced-suicides-in-turkey-479641.html.  
 250 Cohan, supra note 15, at 193.  
 251 See Bilefsky, supra note 2. 
 252 See WIKAN, supra note 39, at 77 (stating that “[h]onor killings may also be camouflaged as suicides”).  
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however, news agencies and the United Nations noted a drastic spike in 
Turkish female suicides.253 The coincidental timing between the appearance of 
suicides and the implementation of harsh punishments for perpetrators of 
honor killings led scholars to establish a causal link between the two 
variables.254 When viewed in conjunction with worldwide trends in suicide, the 
connection between the Penal Code revisions and this metamorphosis appears 
misleadingly strong. 
Across the globe—and particularly in Western countries—men are three to 
four times more likely than women to commit suicide.255 Those women in the 
West who do commit suicide are typically over the age of forty-five.256 In 
Turkey, however, the highest proportion of suicides is committed by young 
females under the age of twenty-four.257 Females under twenty-four years old 
account for fifty percent of all Turkish suicide victims, and that percentage is 
expected to increase in the upcoming years.258 There is no other place in the 
world with the exception of China that reports higher suicide rates for women 
than men.259 
While these “mysterious suicides” have typically been treated with 
suspicion in Turkey, an allegedly dramatic increase in the suicide rate for 2006 
sparked a UN investigation.260 As of May 2006, over thirty-six women had 
attempted suicide in Turkey, which surpassed the rate for the entire 2005 
year.261 In the province of Van alone, there were twenty suicides up through 
May 2006, compared with a total of eighty to ninety between the years 2000 
and 2003.262 By June 2007, more than nineteen young women had attempted 
suicide in Batman, and most were successful.263 According to scholars, these 
 
 253 See Howden, supra note 249.  
 254 Ramakrishna, supra note 215, at 1404.  
 255 Suna Erdem, Honour Suicides: Death by a Bullet in the Back, THE TIMES, May 25, 2006, at 45; see 
Murat Coskun et al., Suicide Rates among Turkish and American Youth: A Cross-Cultural Comparison, 16 
ARCHIVES SUICIDE RESEARCH 59, 63–64 (2012).  
 256 Boris Kálnoky, Rätselhafte Selbstmord-Serie erschüttert die Türkei, DIE WELT (Aug. 28, 2011), http:// 
www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article13561160/Raetselhafte-Selbstmord-Serie-erschuettert-die-Tuerkei.html.  
 257 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 170.  
 258 Coskun et al., supra note 255, at 63–64. 
 259 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 170.  
 260 Erdem, supra note 255; see Bilefsky, supra note 2.  
 261 Howden, supra note 249.  
 262 Erdem, supra note 255.  
 263 Smith, supra note 21.  
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“[u]nusually high rates of suicide among young people are a rather recent 
phenomenon.”264 
In light of the high suicide rate, the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence 
Against Women visited the southeastern provinces of Turkey in 2006 to 
determine whether the suicides were disguised honor killings. The Rapporteur 
cited cases in which police suspected hidden murders, and acknowledged that 
some of the suicides were likely cloaked honor killings.265 Although the 
Rapporteur could not conclude that all of the suicides were disguised murders, 
she did express horror at the number of reported female deaths in Turkey.266 
Despite this unsatisfying conclusion, KA-MER conducted face-to-face 
interviews with over 1,800 women and determined that a large proportion of 
these suicides were forced or cajoled.267 
Moreover, when compared with suicides internationally, approximately 
seventy-seven percent “of the Batman women who took their own lives used 
extremely ‘violent’ and ‘irreversible’ ways to do so (hung, shot or burned 
themselves to death).”268 This is in stark contrast to international literature on 
suicides, which states that women generally use less effective and less violent 
means of killing themselves (for example, ingesting sleeping pills).269 Thus, 
the violent methods used are consistent with the theory of forced suicide, and 
suggest that these suicides are a transformed version of honor killings. Given 
the alleged recentness of the metamorphosis combined with the convenient 
timing of the revised Penal Code’s implementation, a causal connection 
between the two events appears plausible. 
B. The Devil’s Advocate: Why The Causation Theory is Flawed 
Although scholars intuitively posit that harsher punishments under the 
revised Penal Code increase the suicide risk for honor killing victims, the 
researchers fail to prove that honor suicides developed or increased after the 
revised Penal Code took effect. While the publicity of honor suicides 
skyrocketed after 2004, the news articles and statistics repeatedly reference 
 
 264 Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 129.  
 265 United Nations Expert on Violence Against Women Concludes Mission in Turkey, U.N. HUMAN 
RIGHTS (May 31, 2006), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=7658& 
LangID=E; see Bilefsky, supra note 2.  
 266 Howden, supra note 249.  
 267 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 161. 
 268 Id. at 171. 
 269 Id.  
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honor suicides that occurred during the late 1990s and early 2000s, before the 
adoption of the revised Penal Code.270 There are few facts to suggest the 
phenomenon of honor suicides arose in direct response to the threat of 
imprisonment for perpetrators. The inability of scholars to explain the 
existence of honor suicides before the adoption of the revised Penal Code casts 
doubt on their conclusions. 
First, the existence of a high female suicide rate in Turkey—and 
particularly southeastern Turkey—simply supports the proposition that honor 
suicides occur within the Turkish state, not that they arose primarily after 
2004. According to an article published by Christine Toomey in 2006, 281 
females attempted suicide in Batman between 2001 and 2005, which was three 
times the number of attempts by men.271 This statistic, while shocking on its 
face, includes both pre- and post-revision suicides combined. There is no effort 
by the author to separate out the rate of suicide before and after the 
implementation of the revised Penal Code. Instead, the author simply makes 
the sweeping conclusion that the revisions in the Turkish Penal Code, 
combined with EU demands for Turkey to improve human rights, have caused 
this tragic development.272 However, without a detailed list of year-by-year 
suicide rates, it is impossible to substantiate this claim. 
Scholar Jan Goodwin similarly offers a link between the revised Turkish 
Penal Code and honor suicides, directly stating that “Turkish authorities now 
suspect that ‘honor suicides’ are replacing traditional honor killings.”273 In 
support of this assertion, Goodwin reports that between 2001 and 2006 there 
were 1806 honor killings in Turkey and 5375 female suicides.274 Goodwin 
suggests that these numbers support the conclusion that honor killings are 
decreasing across Turkey while honor suicides are on the rise.275 
Unfortunately, Goodwin commits the same error as Toomey, in that she 
combines both pre- and post-revision incidents to inflate the statistics. 
Goodwin never contrasts the number of pre- and post-revision honor killings 
and suicides. Rather, Goodwin uses a five-year time period that offers no 
meaningful comparison of data.276 This is true even if Goodwin’s thesis centers 
 
 270 See Christine Toomey, Where Beast Meets West, SUNDAY TIMES, May 14, 2006, at 45–46.  
 271 Id. at 45.  
 272 See id. at 44.  
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solely on EU pressure and not the Penal Code itself causing the transformation 
of honor killings into honor suicides. Nowhere does Goodwin compare the 
honor killing and suicide statistics for Turkey before and after Turkey’s bid for 
EU accession was accepted. It is impossible to link honor suicides to EU 
influence or the revised Penal Code based solely on this set of insufficient data. 
Furthermore, author Aybige Yilmaz called the causation theory into 
question when she announced that “between 1995 and 2000 the total number 
of reported people committing suicide and attempting suicide in [Batman] was 
191, and seventy-five percent of these were women, a figure well above the 
world average.”277 This data implies the existence of a high female suicide rate 
in Turkey long before the state government “cracked down” on honor killings 
through Penal Code amendments. Moreover, the timeframe examined in this 
article was substantially confined to the period before the EU accepted 
Turkey’s membership bid in late 1999. The logical realization from this article 
and its accompanying data is that honor suicides are more strongly connected 
with the honor-shame complex and honor culture than with EU pressure and 
legal reforms: “Indeed, there seems to be an insidious link, especially in the 
east and south-eastern Turkey, between the unexpectedly high numbers of 
suicides of young women/girls, and the suffocating honour codes they are 
expected to live under.”278 Given the time periods analyzed in the above-
mentioned articles, the only constant variable contributing to honor suicides is 
the underlying patriarchal emphasis on honor within Turkish society. This 
connection between suicides and honor culture has been insufficiently explored 
by scholars to date,279 and remains off their radar due to the use of the revised 
Penal Code as a simplified scapegoat. 
An examination of compiled suicide statistics from the Kurdish Human 
Rights Project reinforces the argument that honor suicides are more closely 
associated with the underlying honor-shame complex than with EU pressure 
and Turkish legal revisions. In Van, a southeastern province of Turkey, the 
Kurdish Human Rights Project reported the following suicide statistics from 
2000 to 2006:280 
 
 277 Aybige Yilmaz, Victims, Villains and Guardian Angels—Batman Suicide Stories, 1 WESTMINSTER 
PAPERS COMM. & CULTURE 66, 67 (2004), http://www.westminster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/20220/ 
006WPCC-Vol1-No1-Aybige_Yilmaz.pdf.  
 278 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 161.  
 279 Kogacioglu, supra note 106, at 129 (“The reasons for such suicides—their potential links to pressures 
having to do with family honor, to the effects of the armed conflict between Kurdish guerillas and the Turkish 
army, or to the economic situation—have not been sufficiently explored.”).  
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2000:    15 suicides 
2001:    27 suicides 
2002:    17 suicides 
2003:    12 suicides 
2004:    11 suicides 
2005:    11 suicides 
2006:    21 suicides 
According to the report, the highest rate of suicide was in 2001, three years 
before the revised Penal Code was adopted. Although the suicide rate 
decreased from 2002 to 2005 and subsequently increased in 2006, this data 
cannot be used to persuasively argue that honor suicides came into existence 
because of the revised Penal Code. In fact, the revised Penal Code was adopted 
in 2004, yet the suicide statistics for both 2004 and 2005 are lower than their 
pre-revision counterparts. Although the suicide rate increased in 2006, it is 
unclear how and if the revised Penal Code had anything to do with it. There is 
simply insufficient data to conclude that the revised Penal Code caused the 
metamorphosis of honor killings into honor suicides. 
Additionally, the report details honor suicides in Batman, which has 
become known as the “suicide city.” The Insan Haklari Derneği (“IHD”) 
collected suicide statistics from press reports and news articles to estimate the 
approximate number of suicides in Batman on an annual basis.281 The 
organization discovered that honor suicides were not reported in the press until 
between 1997 and 1998, and could not collect data on suicides before that 
time.282 However, beginning with the year 1999, IHD documented the number 
of reported suicides or attempted suicides in the press as follows:283 
1999:    53 suicides or attempted suicides (36 of these victims were female) 
2000:    44 suicides or attempted suicides (26 of these victims were female) 
2001:    79 suicides or attempted suicides (52 of these victims were female) 
2002:    68 suicides or attempted suicides (53 of these victims were female) 
2003:    23 suicides or attempted suicides (13 of these victims were female) 
2004:    19 suicides or attempted suicides (8 of these victims were female) 
2005:    25 suicides or attempted suicides (16 of these victims were female) 
 
RIGHTS AND GEND. EQUAL., THE INCREASE IN KURDISH WOMEN COMMITTING SUICIDE 38 (June 2007), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2007/393248/IPOL-FEMM_ET(2007) 
393248_EN.pdf.  
 281 Id. at 41.  
 282 Id.  
 283 Id. 
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2006:    33 suicides or attempted suicides (24 of these victims were female) 
The Bar Association in Batman offered similar statistics for the years 1999 and 
2000, claiming that there were fifty-three suicides in 1999 and of these, thirty-
three victims were women.284 In 2000, the Bar Association reported fifty-seven 
suicides with thirty-eight female victims.285 These data sets for Batman suggest 
that the highest rate of suicide occurred in 2001, which was after the EU 
accepted Turkey’s bid for membership but several years before the adoption of 
the new Penal Code. The years 1999 and 2000 also witnessed significantly 
higher rates of female suicide than the post-revision years of 2005 and 2006. 
Aysan Sev’er called the suicide rate for Batman in 2000 “an unprecedented 
anomaly” and noted that the suicide rate for women jumped to 9.9/100,000.286 
This data even refutes the argument that honor suicides have dramatically 
increased after the legal revisions were implemented. Thus, the causal link 
between honor suicides and the revised Turkish Penal Code is unsubstantiated 
by the data. 
Furthermore, investigation into the motive of the suicide is extraordinarily 
difficult when the victim does not survive. Families that force a female to take 
her own life or stage the homicide as a suicide do not typically confess to the 
crime, particularly if their motive is to avoid imprisonment.287 There is a strong 
possibility that reporters overestimate the number of forced suicides by simply 
assuming that all female suicides are honor killing substitutes. It is impossible 
to know how many suicide victims were forced to kill themselves versus the 
number of women that committed suicide for other reasons. For example, a 
study conducted by the Turkish Statistical Institute found that only 9.1% of 
attempted female suicides were due to “family incompatibility.”288 The 
implication from this study is that 90.9% of suicides were the result of non-
family influence. This lack of conclusive evidence that suicides are honor-
related prevented the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, 
Yakin Erturk, from concluding that the suicides in southeastern Turkey were 
actually disguised honor killings. According to Erturk, “[n]ational and 
international media have speculated whether suicides of women and girls are in 
 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
 286 SEV’ER, supra note 35, at 170.  
 287 See id., at 181.  
 288 Suicide Statistics, 2012, TURKISH STATISTICS INST. (June 20, 2013), http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/ 
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reality disguised honour killings or forced suicides. For many of the cases 
reported to me, these speculations probably do not hold true.”289 
Thus, the blanket claim by reporters and scholars that honor killings have 
transformed into honor suicides as a direct consequence of the revised Penal 
Code lacks evidentiary support. The statistics and data provided by both 
governmental institutions and popular news media fail to separate pre- and 
post-revision suicides and do not account for how any alleged increase in 
suicides is directly linked to a decrease in honor killings. There have been no 
studies conducted analyzing the rates of suicide and honor killings over the 
years leading up to the Penal Code revisions and the years following its 
adoption. The data, as it currently stands, is too tenuous to support the causal 
connection that scholars and researchers espouse. Rather, it is more likely that 
the suicides are intertwined with the underlying systems of honor and shame 
that dominate certain aspects of society, and the alleged increase in honor 
suicides is due to persistent media attention. 
V.  THE NECESSITY OF COMMUNITY DISCOURSE FOR HONOR CRIME 
ERADICATION 
Although the connection between honor suicides and the revised Penal 
Code is likely not one of causation, the fact remains that the revised Penal 
Code has failed to effectively eliminate honor crimes within Turkey’s borders. 
Regardless of form, honor crimes exist within Turkey—and worldwide—at an 
unacceptable rate, and top-down legal reformation has failed to sufficiently 
mitigate the crime. In light of the fact that both honor killings and honor 
suicides still exist almost ten years after adoption of the Penal Code revisions, 
it is time to acknowledge that legal amendments and judicial overhaul are 
insufficient by themselves to eradicate honor crimes. Rather, for the revised 
Code to acquire legitimacy and command obedience, community perceptions 
of honor and honor crimes must change from the ground up. This section 
advocates for implementation of community discourse programs throughout 
the Turkish state in order to effectively undermine the honor-shame complex 
that fuels these murders. 
 
 289 Press Release, United Nations, supra note 269; see UN Urges Turkey to Probe Claims of Forced 
Suicide Among Women, KURD NET (May 1, 2006), http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2006/6/ 
turkeykurdistan714.htm (“[Yakin] Erturk explained that many of the suicide cases reported to her in the 
provinces of Batman, Sanliurfa and Van did not appear to be suspicious.”). 
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A. The Failure of Legal Revisions 
The revisions to the Turkish Penal Code, while commendable and 
necessary, have failed to mitigate and combat both honor killings and honor 
suicides in any appreciable manner. Although the revised Penal Code offers no 
place for discrimination against women, many females nonetheless experience 
horrible deaths at the hands of their family members.290 “Like a wounded 
dinosaur, the patriarchal strongholds are extracting a few more victims in the 
hope of preserving the status quo,” and family members are undeterred by the 
possibility of legal sanctions.291 The legal equality of the sexes has done little 
to end honor violence against women.292 Thus, while the Penal Code may have 
changed and strengthened overnight, feudal patriarchal values are not so 
adaptable.293 
One reason for the inefficiency of the Penal Code in combating honor 
crimes is that women must still file a complaint to receive legal protection. 
This requirement keeps “many of the new provisions [of the Penal Code] out 
of reach for victims.”294 This is particularly true in the southeastern provinces 
of the country, where the literacy rate is frighteningly low.295 Additionally, the 
complicity of both the state and police deter numerous victims from seeking 
legal protection. Turkish police have been known to “openly side with the 
perpetrators” and are reluctant to follow up on complaints of honor crimes.296 
Women who do seek help are frequently told to return to their husbands, and 
are denied protection if their situation is not grave enough.297 Moreover, there 
is little differentiation among the police between accidents and suicides, and 
the ability to bribe a Turkish police officer is not a foreign concept.298 Even if a 
woman is able to acquire police protection, family members have traditionally 
been able to use the legal and law enforcement systems to locate the female in 
hiding and bring her home to face “justice.”299 
 
 290 Sev’er & Yurdakul, supra note 32, at 988.  
 291 Id.  
 292 Mojab & Hassanpour, supra note 47, at 85.  
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Furthermore, the discriminatory attitudes of public officials have caused 
familial violence to be perceived as a “fact of life” in the Kurdish dominated 
southeast.300 A majority of police, gendarme, lawyers, judges, and legislators 
within the country are disproportionately male, and may continue to harbor 
stereotypical beliefs about Kurdish culture.301 Public officials, schools, and 
police “have been reluctant to become involved in what they tend to see as 
family disputes,” even after the adoption of the revised Penal Code.302 Thus, 
while the legal code itself may have changed, the frontline response to reports 
of honor crimes—police intervention and investigation—has been historically 
abysmal.303 
It is for these reasons that a narrow legal approach unaccompanied by 
broader cultural initiatives is ineffective at reducing and eliminating honor 
crimes within Turkey. There must be a “recognition that law-based strategies 
alone are not enough, and that there is a need for other interventions.”304 
Proposed legislation and implemented revisions that punish perpetrators are 
too reactive and arrive too late to the party.305 By the time law is invoked, there 
is often a corpse, not a frightened victim. Therefore, effective eradication of 
honor crimes must employ a proactive strategy that addresses the underlying 
frameworks of patriarchy and honor that give rise to these killings and 
suicides. It is time to recognize that the law is not enough. 
B. Community Discourse: Why Muslim Women can Slay Their Own Dragons 
The unparalleled fascination of “Western” culture with the “spectacularly 
oppressive practices” of Turkey and the Middle East has resulted in 
tremendous international pressure to address global human rights violations.306 
“Western” feminists have mobilized around issues of domestic violence and 
murder primarily affecting Muslim women.307 These activists operate from the 
assumption that the values of freedom and choice are universal and should be 
achieved in every community.308 From this dialogue, a category of “pulp 
nonfiction” is created in which “Western” nations must continuously save 
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Muslim women.309 The intricate complexities of honor crimes are “simplified 
to fit a narrative of progress in which downtrodden Muslim women [are] given 
new lives by enlightened ‘saviors’ who rescue[] them from ‘savages.’”310 In 
direct response to this rhetoric, international organizations impose constant 
pressure on the Middle East to increase honor crime punishments and “crack 
down” on perpetrators. 
This interaction, however, between the Middle East (specifically Turkey) 
and its international allies obscures the social realities of honor crimes, and 
results in untenable solutions. Women’s experiences are shaped differently 
based on their geographic location, class position, and religious beliefs.311 A 
“one-size-fits-all” approach is both arrogant and catastrophic. Without 
understanding the societal fabric upon which honor crimes occur, it is 
impossible to propose a workable solution to these human rights violations. 
“Western” organizations that apply pressure on these communities to 
“modernize” and eradicate honor crimes do so by advocating “Western” 
solutions. Not only does this imply moral superiority on the part of the “West,” 
but it also encourages gender and cultural subordination on an international 
scale.312 
When faced with “Western” pressure to combat honor crimes, Turkey and 
similar countries adopt resolutions that modernize their state institutions, 
infrastructure, legal codes, and legislative processes. Unfortunately, these 
actions, encouraged by the international community, do not substantially 
further their cause.313 As seen with the revised Turkish Penal Code, top-down 
reformations cannot change the underlying patriarchal and honor structures of 
society.314 In fact, the same state officials and local elites who propose these 
top-down measures are themselves products of the same culture that produces 
honor crimes.315 Rather, the solution must start from the ground up, beginning 
with community discourse. 
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The term community discourse denotes “discussion of all aspect of ‘crimes 
of honour’ within the community” where they occur.316 This strategy is 
premised on the view that the state is complicit in honor crimes, and that 
reliance on external pressure to eliminate honor killings and suicides is a form 
of cultural imperialism.317 Community discourse works as a local solution to 
help transform family and community attitudes towards honor crimes. As a 
proactive attempt to change the patriarchal structures that support these 
killings, community discourse generates and sustains a local dialogue aimed at 
redefining the concept of honor.318 “The goal of this community discourse 
should be to change the normative meaning of the communications 
surrounding the possession of honor property.”319 Because the notion of honor 
is so deeply imbedded in Turkish culture, the traditional “Western” human 
rights framework ineffectively treats perpetrators as criminals rather than 
perceiving them as victims of their own cultural masculinity. Thus, an effective 
solution for honor crimes must alter the very social fabric that legitimizes the 
crimes in the first place. A purely reactive, legal approach is useless where 
honor crimes are the norm, not the exception.320 
One of the most prominent examples of successful community discourse in 
Turkey is the women’s organization KA-MER. Located in Turkey’s 
southeastern province of Diyarbakir, KA-MER strives to address the problem 
of honor killings before the executions occur through direct interaction with 
the family councils.321 According to Leyla Pervizat, an activist at KA-MER: 
We try to give men what I call cultural and psychological space 
where their masculinity is not challenged and they do not feel forced 
to kill in order to cleanse their honor. To do this, and in order to help 
create space for long-term change, we take advantage of some of the 
positive aspects of Turkish culture that offer individual men an 
excuse to avoid violence. These include special occasions and 
gatherings where nonviolent negotiations are encouraged or where 
authority figures can act as intermediaries, in which we can make use 
of traditions of hospitality toward guests or respect for elderly 
people’s recommendations as tools to prevent these crimes.322 
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With an approximate two month window between when a killing is ordered 
and when it takes place, KA-MER has ample time to discuss the motivations 
for murder with the victim’s family and find a less violent solution.323 The 
most respected members of KA-MER visit the patriarchs and humbly ask them 
to reverse honor killing decrees by reminding them of honor outside the sexual 
context.324 In this way, the conception of honor is actually used to combat 
honor crimes in a culturally sensitive manner. Because activists at KA-MER 
have an understanding of the tribal and clan structures of the southeastern 
provinces, they can succeed at “building gendered bridges, in a land that is 
fractured by land-ownership patterns and ethnic conflict.”325 This internal 
approach to honor killings exposes the patriarchs to women’s views on honor 
crimes in a respectful and non-threatening interaction that does not involve the 
courts or law. Thus, rather than trying to dismantle the honor structure from the 
outside in, KA-MER employs a localized strategy that does not require the 
“West” to save Muslim women. Muslim women themselves are leading a more 
successful campaign against honor crimes from within their own borders. 
The success of KA-MER’s program is undeniable. The number of women 
applying to KA-MER has increased each year, totaling 750 applicants between 
2003 and 2010.326 Of these 750 applicants, 414 received assistance from the 
organization, and only three women died.327 Even the police have started to 
regularly consult KA-MER in honor-related complaints, and have referred 
women to the organization for assistance.328 In this manner, KA-MER 
stimulates a communal dialogue that emphasizes the positive functions of 
honor without imposing a stereotypical “Western” solution. Therefore, KA-
MER attempts to disassociate the concept of honor from women’s bodies and 
create neutral spaces in which family and community attitudes towards these 
crimes can be transformed. 
If the brutality of honor crimes is to be stopped, then “Western” and 
international organizations must begin working with the victims and women in 
these cultures instead of working for them. Because culture informs and 
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constructs both our identities and our experiences, it is impossible to combat 
patriarchal femicide without first understanding the environment in which it is 
created.329 It is for this reason that the proposed solutions must have the 
cooperation of the community in order to thrive.330 Furthermore, including 
community discourse in the honor crime solution is necessary out of respect 
for the autonomy of families within those communities.331 It is time for the 
solutions to femicide and honor killings to originate within the cultural 
framework itself rather than from external pressure to modernize and 
criminalize the perpetrators.332 Foreign intervention is no longer necessary to 
“save” Muslim women—these women are powerful enough to save 
themselves. Thus, the international community should devote resources to 
fostering local community discourse through agencies such as KA-MER and 
should avoid advocating one-size-fits-all “Westernized” solutions. 
CONCLUSION 
In the context of Turkish honor killings, the collision between cultural 
norms and textual law appears like clashing waves in the sea. Pitting 
patriarchal values against top-down modernization, the Turkish state has thrust 
honor killings to the forefront of a political battle over women’s bodies. On the 
one hand, women’s bodies “are seen as the battlegrounds for men’s struggles 
to assert and reclaim their masculinity,”333 and on the other, the female figure 
is perceived as a marker of modernity. The tension between these two extremes 
has produced sensationalized literature on honor crimes, and has resulted in the 
ethnicization of murder. 
Particularly, the “Western” association of honor killings with the Islamic 
faith has constructed Muslim women as passive victims “bound by the 
unbreakable chains of religious and patriarchal oppression.”334 Whereas 
“Western” women are deceptively liberated, Muslim women are portrayed as 
slaves to patriarchal rules and gender constraints.335 In this manner, the image 
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of the oppressed Muslim woman ensures a stabilized theme of “Western” 
superiority and dominance. 
As the forerunner for modernization, the “West” has waged an international 
war on cultural forms of femicide that are labeled as backward, barbaric, and 
primitive.336 Honor killings in particular have been singled out for their 
cultural uniqueness and targeted by the international community as threats to 
modernization. Faced with both international and EU pressure to eradicate 
honor crimes in order to foster accession negotiations, Turkey has engaged in 
its own “othering” of the crime to disassociate itself from these “cultural” 
killings. Specifically, Turkey has adopted its own ethnicization of murder to 
marginalize an already disadvantaged minority group—the Kurds. By isolating 
the Kurds, Turkey positions itself closer to the “West” on the modernization 
spectrum, and uses honor killings as a mask for forced assimilation programs 
against the Kurds. In this manner, Turkey strips the Kurdish culture of its 
moral values and complexity, and ignores the role that state institutions play in 
perpetuating violence. 
Although comprehending honor killings from an ethno-cultural and 
regional perspective is exceedingly restrictive, Turkey nonetheless targeted 
Kurdish honor killing perpetrators through top-down legal reformation. By 
“cracking down” on the leniency previously granted to perpetrators, Turkey 
modernized its Penal Code to impose harsher punishments for honor crimes. 
These legal revisions, however, led scholars and reporters to claim that honor 
killings had simply transformed into honor suicides. 
As this Article has shown, the causal link between honor suicides and the 
revised Turkish Penal Code is tenuous at best and likely nonexistent.337 The 
statistical data does not support this linkage, but rather undermines its strength. 
Without clear pre- and post-revision statistics, it is impossible to compare 
honor killing and honor suicide frequency within the necessary timeframes. 
Instead, given the data currently available, it is much more likely that honor 
suicides are connected with the underlying patriarchal structures that fuel 
honor killings. Regardless of what caused the emergence of these suicides, it 
remains clear that the revised Penal Code has failed to appreciably reduce 
honor crimes throughout Turkey. 
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Rather than implementing a doomed top-down legal approach to honor 
crimes, the most effective solution lies in the strategy of community discourse. 
While the law may change overnight, the underlying cultural and patriarchal 
values that fuel societal morality are not so easily altered. In order to 
delegitimize the conception of honor as property concealed within the female 
body, there must be “active and sustained discursive engagement with local 
communities.”338 Women must be provided the tools to undermine these 
structures from within, and there is no place for allegedly superior 
“Westernized” solutions. Honor crimes cannot be stopped without directly 
understanding the cultural environment in which they were first created. It is 
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